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STOCKMARKET VOLATILITY AND 401(K) PLANS 
Colleen E. Medill* 
Many workers today depend on their 401(k) plan to provide them with an ade-
quate income during retirement. For these workers to achieve retirement income 
security, their 401(k) plan investments must peiform well over their working life-
time. Employers' selection of investment options for the 401(k) plan, a fiduciary 
duty under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (AIUSA), plays 
a critical role in determining investment peiformance. In this Article, Professor 
Medill uses a series of hypothetical litigation scenarios to illustrate how interpre-
tation of the employer's duty of prudence and duty of loyalty under ERISA present 
different policy choices for the federal courts. Professor Medill examines various 
hypothetical situations involving mutual fund fees and company stock where 
ERISA's duty of loyalty will require the federal courts to determine if an employer 
has received permissible incidental benefits or engaged in prohibited self-interested 
conduct when selecting 401(k) plan investment options. 
Because employers today rely upon the Department of Labor's 404(c) Regulations 
to allow participants to select among plan investment options without incurring 
potential fiduciary liability, Professor Medill examines various policy issues likely 
to arise as federal courts interpret the details of the 404( c) Regulations. The A rti-
cle cautions against judicial interpretations of the 404( c) Regulations that will 
have a potential chilling effect on voluntary plan sponsorship by employers. The 
Article also addresses an important exception to the 404(c) Regulations, the 
automatic enrollment plan. Professor Medill argues for a judicial interpretation 
of ERISA that encourages employers to select a default investment option for 
automatically enrolled participants that is broadly diversifzed in the equity mar-
kets, rather than a low-earning money market fund. 
The A rticle concludes by examining the potential remedies available under AIUSA 
for 401 (k) plan participants injured by their employer's breach of fiduciary duty. 
Professor Medill concludes that, consistent with existing caselaw precedent, fed-
eral courts can and should afford injured 401(k) plan participants a remedy 
under ERISA. 
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law. B.A. 1985, 
University of Kansas; J.D. 1989, University of Kansas School of Law. I would like to thank 
Professors Carol Parker and Joan Heminway for their helpful comments, and Lee Robinson 
for his excellent research assistance in the preparation of this Article. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When baby boomers realize they don't have enough money to retire, 
they might start suing their employers over the returns of the funds in 
their 401 (k) plans . ... [IJt will eventually dwarf tobacco, firearms 
and other product liability litigation.! 
Watching the daily performance of the stock market has be-
come America's new national pastime. "What is the market doing 
today?" has joined workplace conversations devoted formerly to 
sports scores and political elections. With increasing regularity, 
the day's lead news story is another market correction or up-
surge, or the falling fortunes of a newly public Internet 
company.2 Why have we, as a nation, become obsessed with the 
gyrations of the stock market? For many, the answer lies in that 
much of their personal wealth and the security of their future re-
tirement is tied to the fortunes of the market through their 
employer-sponsored 401 (k) plan. 3 
Widespread volatility in the stock market has come generally as 
a shock to many 401 (k) participants accustomed to enjoying un-
precedented investment returns on their retirement funds in 
recent years.4 Stock market volatility affects disproportionately em-
ployees whose future retirement income is linked to the financial 
fortunes of their employers through investments in company stock 
1. Arleen Jacobius, Signet Outcome Could Change How Retirement Plans Are Run, PEN-
SIONS & INVESTMENTS, May 17, 1999, at 6. 
2. David P. Hamilton & Mylene Mangalindan, Angels of Death: Reality Bites Hard as 
String of Dot·Coms Sees Funding Dry Up, WALL ST. J., May 25, 2000, at AI; Greg Ip & E.S. 
Browning, Getting ReaL' What Are Tech Stocks Worth, Now that We Know It Isn't Infinity?, WALL 
ST.J., Apr. 17,2000, at AI; Gregory Zuckerman, Despite RaUy, Recovery Is No Sure Thing, WALL 
ST. J., Oct. 16, 2000, at Cl; Gregory Zuckerman & E.S. Browning, Shock Treatment: Stocks 
Tumble Broadly on Mideast Violence and Earnings Fears, WALL ST. J., Oct. 13, 2000, at AI. In-
deed, tracking the financial misfortunes of companies has become something of an Internet 
cottage industry in itself. See UPSIDE TODAY DOTCOM GRAVEYARD, at http:// 
www.upside.com/texis/mvrn/graveyard/index (last visited Jan. 18, 2001) (on file with the 
University of Michigan Journal of Law Refrmn); FUCKEDCOMPANY, at http:// 
www.fuckedcompany.com (last visited Jan. 18, 2001) (on file with the University of Michigan 
Journal of Law Refrmn); StartupFAILURES, at http://www.startupfailures.com (last visited 
Jan. 18, 2001) (on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Refrmn). 
3. The 401 (k) plan takes its name from the Internal Revenue Code section from 
which it is derived. EMPLOYEE BENEFITS RESEARCH INST., FUNDAMENTALS OF EMPLOYEE 
BENEFIT PROGRAMS 93 (5th ed. 1997). In a 401(k) plan, the employee elects to have her 
employer contribute a portion of her compensation to the plan instead of receiving that 
compensation as current income. Id. at 94-95. 
4. Mike Clowes, Reversion Could Be Mean, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Sept. 20, 1999, at 
10. 
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held in a 401 (k) plan.5 Stock market volatility raises new legal is-
sues concerning an employer's responsibilities in establishing and 
operating 401 (k) plans for their employees. To date, these issues, 
and perhaps more importantly, their implications for national re-
tirement policy, have not been explored by legal scholars. 6 The first 
significant wave of litigation concerning these issues is beginning to 
reach the federal courts. 7 These cases have garnered substantial at-
tention in the press,s leading experts to predict that litigation 
involving 401 (k) plans will become commonplace in the future. 9 
This new genre of 401 (k) plan litigation is likely to arise under 
three scenarios. The first scenario involves a substantial and 
sustained downward correction in the overall stock market. The 
second scenario involves an employer who offers its own publicly 
traded stock as an investment option for its employees' 401 (k) 
plan. Under either of these scenarios, unhappy 401 (k) plan 
5. See infra note 52. 
6. Publications on the subject to date have focused narrowly on the technical legal 
requirements for participant directed 401 (k) plans. See generally Keith R. Pyle, Compliance 
Under ERISA Section 404(c) with Increasing Investment Alternatives and Account Accessibility, 32 
IND. L. REv. 1467 (1999) (analyzing the requirements of ERISA section 404(c) and assessing 
compliance difficulties resulting from a large number of investment alternatives and auto-
mated interaction by participants); Yolanda Sayles, Section 404(c) Plan Fees and Expenses: Is 
There an Affirmative Duty to Disclose?, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1461 (1999) (arguing that 
courts should find in ERISA section 404(c) an affirmative fiduciary duty to disclose fee and 
expense information to plan participants). 
7. See Franklin v. First Union Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 720, 726 (E.D. Va. 2000); 
Mehling v. New York Life Ins. Co., No. 99-CV-5417, 1, 82-87 (E.D. Pa. filed june 14, 
2000, amended july 25, 2000), available at http://www.newyorklifesuit.com (last visited 
Mar. 31, 2001); Gottlieb v. SBC Communications, Inc., No. CV-00-04139, AHM (MANx) , 
1, 34-41 (C.D. Cal. filed Apr. 18, 2000, amended Nov. 6, 2000), available at 
http://www.airtouchsuit.com (last visited Mar. 31, 2001). 
8. See Russ Banham, Defending Your 401(k), CFO MAG., Apr. 1,2000, at 69; David B. 
Brandolph, Investments: Lawsuit Alleges Misuse of Plan Assets to Create Insurer's Mutual Fund 
Vehicles, PENSION & BENEFITS DAILY REp.,june 21, 2000, at D22; Albert B. Crenshaw, Employ-
ees Sue SBC over Stock in 401 (k), WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 2000, at E3; Elayne R. Demby, 
Proprietary Problems, PLAN SPONSOR,july-Aug. 1999, at 72; Robert S. England, When Pensions 
Change Hands, CFO MAG., Aug. 1999, at 69; Phyllis Feinberg, Class Action: New York Life Is 
Bracingfor Lawsuit, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, May 29, 2000, at 1; Guy Halverson, Sure You're 
Secure? How to Spot Flaws in a 401(k), CHRISTIAN SCI. MONIToR,june 12,2000, at 15; Vanessa 
Hua, Conflicts Arise from 401(k) Plans, S.F. EXAMINER,june 18, 2000, at Dl; Arleenjacobius, A 
Change in Plans? SBC Suit May Alter Running of 401 (k)s, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, May 1, 
2000, at 6; joel J. Meyer, Class Action Filed Alleging Company Manipulated Tax Code Section 
401(k) Plan, 27 PENSIONS & BENEFITS REp. 1084 (2000);jeff D. Opdyke & Ellen E. Schultz, 
SBC Faces Suit Over Retirement Plans, WALL ST. j., Apr. 19, 2000, at A2; Ellen E. Schultz & Ken 
Brown, New York Life'S Pension Plans Raise Questions, WALL ST.J.,june 12,2000, at CI. 
9. See Banham, supra note 8, at 69-70; Barry B. Burr, 401 (k)s Next Target of Suits?, PEN-
SIONS & INVESTMENTS, May 15, 2000, at 10; Arleenjacobius, 401(k) Precedent? First Union Suit 
May Help Define Responsibility, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Sept. 20, 1999, at 1 [hereinafter 
Jacobius, 401(k) Precedent?l;jacobius, supra note I, at 124; Linda E. Rosenzweig, 401(k) Plan 
Litigation Increases, N.Y.LJ.,june 19,2000, at 9, 11. 
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participants who suffer significant investment losses are likely to 
seek relief in the federal courts. 
The third scenario for future 401 (k) plan litigation is distinctly 
different from the first two. Under this scenario, the stock market 
continues to rise. The 401 (k) plan participants do not suffer an 
investment loss. Rather, the gravamen of employee complaint is 
that the participants suffered an opportunity loss. In other words, 
based on the stock market's rising performance, their 401 (k) plan 
accounts should have earned more than they actually did. 
Under each scenario, the participants' claims must be made un-
der the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 10 the 
federal statute that exclusively governs the rights of 401 (k) plan 
participants and the responsibilities of the employers who sponsor 
them!1 This Article explores the issues that are likely to arise in 
future 401 (k) plan litigation sparked by stock market volatility. 
ERISA's statutory language itself is unhelpful. The key to resolving 
these issues lies in the federal regulations and caselaw that grant 
broad discretion to the federal courts. 12 The exercise of this judi-
cial discretion will, in effect, place the federal judiciary in a 
controversial policy-making role. 
In his article, Judges As Advicegivers, 13 Professor Neal Kumar 
Katyal describes one of the historical roles of the federal courts as 
giving advice on matters of public policy. He advocates this advice-
giving role in the limited context of constitutional cases heard by 
the Supreme Court. 14 Although lower federal court cases involv-
ing the interpretation of ERISA are certainly not as glamorous as 
constitutional litigation, Chief Justice Rehnquist himself acknowl-
edged publicly that such cases are likely to be of much more 
practical importance.15 
10. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994 & Supp.1I 1996). 
11. Title I of ERISA regulates all types of employee pension benefit plans, including 
401 (k) plans. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(3) (defining employee benefit plan), 1003(a) (defining 
ERISA's coverage) (1994). Employee benefit plans sponsored for employees of federal, 
state or local governments or agencies or churches generally are excluded from coverage 
under Title I of ERISA. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b) (1994 & Supp. II 1996). Unfunded executive 
deferred compensation plans, or "top hat" plans, are also excluded. Peter J. Wiedenbeck, 
J<."'RlSA s Curious Coverage, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 311, 342 (1998). 
12. ERISA gives federal district courts exclusive jurisdiction over civil actions involving 
an employer's breach of fiduciary duties under the statute. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(l) (1994). 
The types of civil actions that may be brought by participants in a 401 (k) plan for an em-
ployer's breach of fiduciary duty are discussed infra Part II. No right to a jury trial exists for 
breach of fiduciary duty claims under ERISA; the federal district court judge acts as the trier 
offact. A.B.A. EMPLOYEE BENEFITS COMM., EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAw 634-35 (1991). 
13. 50 STAN. L. REv. 1709 (1998). 
14. Id.atl711. 
15. In a 1997 speech at the dedication of the Harrison Law Grounds at the University 
of Virginia Law School, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated: 
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Judge Abner J. Mikva responds to Professor Katyal by arguing 
that a conscious practice of advice-giving by federal judges is inap-
propriate because "you could not find a group of people less 
experienced and less suited to legislative decision making than fed-
eraljudges.,,16 He contends that most judges prefer to avoid telling 
"policymakers how to make policy" by writing judicial opinions 
that omit nonessential dicta. 17 Judge Mikva's assertion is true for 
policy issues under ERISA, a notoriously technical area of law. 
Nevertheless, the federal courts, rather than Congress, usually 
have the final word on ERISA's fiduciary policy. Employers who 
sponsor retirement plans for their employees (or, perhaps more 
accurately, the highly specialized ERISA experts who counsel 
them) scrutinize judicial opinions for "advice" concerning an em-
ployer's fiduciary responsibilities and conform their behavior 
accordingly. IS Thus, no matter how narrowly a judge tailors her 
holding to the specific facts of the case, in ERISA matters, the pri-
mary audience will attempt to read "advice" into it. Worse, is the 
situation in which, although attempting to issue an opinion based 
strictly on the facts of the case, a judge unknowingly and inadver-
tently sends out policy signals to the employee benefits 
community. This unconscious advice-giving by the federal judiciary 
leads to unprincipled policy. Finally, the federal judiciary cannot 
rationalize its policy-making role on the assumption that Congress 
can always amend the statute. The statutory sections at issue in 
ERISA fiduciary litigation remain unchanged since their original 
enactment in 1974. Any attempts to amend these provisions will 
If one examines the current offerings of the University of Virginia Law School, one 
learns that this year there are some 160 courses offered, and some 90 seminars. This 
is an intellectual feast that stands in sharp contrast, certainly, to the offerings of my 
law school when I attended long ago. When one looks further, one sees that there 
are at least three courses offered just on the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. BY'contrast, there seems to be no course offering devoted to federal 
regulation of employer-employee benefit and retirement plans-an area of the law 
which is much less glamorous, receives much less media attention, but the ramifica-
tions of which have a far greater effect on the daily lives of people than do the 
nuances of First Amendment law. Surely practitioners are much more likely to have 
clients with pension and benefit plan problems than with separation of church and 
state problems. 
Chief justice William H. Rehnquist, Address at the Dedication of the David A. Harrison II 
Law Grounds, University of Virginia (Nov. 8, 1997) (transcript on file with author). 
16. Abner J. Mikva, «-7Iy Judges Should Not Be Advicegivers: A Response to ProJessor Neal 
Katya~ 50 STAN. L. REv. 1825, 1827 (1998). 
17. [d. at 1826. 
18. See England, supra note 8, at 74;jacobius, supra note 8 at 6; jacobius, supra note 9, 
at 61. 
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spark interest group battles of titanic proportions that will lead to 
the classic congressional response: inaction. 19 
This pragmatic Article considers a third approach to advice-
giving by the federal courts-one that lies somewhere between the 
positions of Professor Katyal and Judge Mikva. Unlike Professor 
Katyal's elite area of constitutional law, ERISA is an area in which 
most federal judges would be the first to admit that their policy 
expertise, if it exists at all, is limited. Yet contrary to Judge Mikva's 
view, the coming wave of 401 (k) plan fiduciary litigation will thrust 
the federal judiciary, albeit perhaps unwillingly, into the role of 
shaping future national retirement policy. The federal courts' 
"advice" will not be given to Congress, but primarily to the em-
ployers who sponsor 401 (k) plans, and, more importantly, to the 
employee benefits experts who counsel them. 
National retirement policy ~ill be better served by a federal ju-
diciary that is cognizant of the policy implications its decisions will 
have on future 401 (k) plan litigation. This Article intends to sensi-
tize the federal courts to the policy choices and ramifications that 
underlie the novel legal issues ushered in by today's new world of 
stock market volatility and 40I"(k) plans. 
Part I overviews the rise to prominence of the participant di-
rected 401 (k) plan. Part I also introduces the three primary 
fiduciary duties ERISA imposes upon employers who sponsor re-
tirement plans: the duties of prudence, loyalty, and prudent 
diversification of plan assets. 
Part II analyzes how each of these fiduciary duties potentially 
applies in the context of participant directed 401 (k) plans. This 
analysis emphasizes the policy-making role the federal courts will 
play in interpreting and applying ERISA's duties to employers who 
sponsor 401 (k) plans. In Part II and continuing throughout the 
remainder of the Article, a series of hypotheticals are used to illus-
trate and discuss the legal issues and policy choices the federal 
courts will confront in future 401 (k) plan litigation under ERISA. 
Part II begins with an analysis of the employer's duty of pru-
dence in selecting the investment options for its 401 (k) plan. This 
analysis is divided into two sections. First the employer's decision-
making process in selecting various mutual funds as investment 
options for its 401 (k) plan is analyzed. Second, the additional fac-
tors an employer should consider if it also chooses to include 
19. The aftermath of the Supreme Court's decision in Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, 508 
U.S. 248 (1993), is a prime example. Subsequent legislative attempts to override the Su-
preme Court's narrow interpretation of the scope of employer fiduciary liability under 
ERISA section 502(a) (3) were abandoned in the face of interest group opposition. JOHN H. 
LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 724-25 (2d ed. 1995). 
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company stock as an investment option for its 401 (k) plan is exam-
ined. Next, Part II analyzes the employer's duty of loyalty in 
selecting mutual funds and company stock as investment options. 
The close connection between fees and expenses to the employer's 
selection of mutual funds for the plan's investment options, and 
how this connection creates a potential conflict of interest for the 
sponsoring employer is also discussed. Another potential conflict 
of interest arises when an employer includes company stock as an 
investment option, which can lead to potential breaches of the 
employer's duty ofloyalty under ERISA. 
Part II, finally, examines the duty of prudent diversification of 
plan assets. Here, the growing tendency among employers to 
automatically enroll their employees in 401 (k) plans and the 
unique policy challenge that this relatively recent development 
present to the federal courts is addressed. Part II ends with a dis-
cussion of the employer's regulatory defense to alleged breaches 
of the duty of prudent diversification in the context of participant 
directed 401 (k) plans. This discussion also outlines the policy-
making role the federal courts will playas they interpret and apply 
this employer defense in future 401 (k) plan fiduciary litigation. 
Part III analyzes the potential remedies available under ERISA 
for breaches of the employer's fiduciary duties of prudence, loy-
alty, and prudent diversification of plan assets. It begins with an 
overview of Supreme Court jurisprudence concerning ERISA 
remedies. Part III then builds upon Part II by presenting a series of 
hypothetical scenarios where the federal courts must determine 
whether, given a breach of fiduciary duty by the employer, a rem-
edy is available under ERISA to the participants in the employer's 
401 (k) plan. Part III emphasizes the policy choices that the federal 
courts will be making as they interpret and apply ERISA's remedy 
provisions to 401 (k) plans. 
I. BACKGROUND: How WE BECAME A "401 (K) NATION,,2o 
ERISA, enacted in 1974,21 predates the authorization of the 
401 (k) plan.22 Nevertheless, ERISA's fiduciary responsibility 
20. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REp. (June 28,1999) (front cover). 
21. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 
829 (1974). 
22. The 401(k) plan became possible as a result of changes made to the Internal 
Revenue Code by the Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 135, 92 Stat. 2763, 2785 
(1978) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 401(k»; Colleen E. Medill, The Individual 
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provisions govern the conduct of employers who sponsor 401 (k) 
plans.23 In addition, ERISA provides the exclusive remedies 
available to 401 (k) participants when an employer breaches its 
ERISA fiduciary duties.24 
That ERISA was enacted prior to the development of the 401 (k) 
plan is critically important, yet easily overlooked. The chronology 
explains in large part the interpretative difficulties and related pol-
icy choices the federal courts will confront in attempting to apply 
ERISA's statutory provisions to employers who sponsor 401 (k) 
plans. These interpretive difficulties and policy choices are de-
scribed in Parts II and III below, but to set the stage, an overview of 
the participant directed 401 (k) plan's rise to prominence is neces-
sary. 
ERISA generally imposes fiduciary duties of loyalty,25 prudence,26 
and prudent diversification of plan assets27 upon employers who 
sponsor retirement plans. ERISA's duty of prudent diversification 
of plan assets historically presented a major obstacle to participant 
directed investments in 401 (k) plans. In a 401 (k) plan, an em-
ployee elects to contribute part of her compensation to the plan 
instead of receiving that money as current income.28 Because the 
plan is funded with an employee's own money, many employees 
prefer to have a voice in how their retirement savings are in-
vested.29 Employers were reluctant in 1974, however, to turn 
investment control for a traditional defined benefit plan over to 
their employees. Employers feared that ERISA's duty of prudent 
diversification of plan assets would render them liable for invest-
ment losses suffered by participants who did not select a diversified 
range of investments for their 401 (k) plan accounts. 
This fear was well-founded. Numerous studies of participant di-
rected investments in 401 (k) plans indicate that, although plan 
investments may be diversified investments on an aggregate basis, 
Responsibility Model of Retirement Plans Today: Conforming ERISA Policy to Reality, 49 EMORY LJ. 
1,7 & n.26 (2000). 
23. 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (1994 & Supp. II 1996). 
24. [d. §§ 1001, 1132(a)(2),(3) (1994). ERISA preempts state law causes of action for 
an employer'S breach of fiduciary duty. [d. § 1144(a). 
25. [d. § 1l04(a)(l) (A); see also Donovan v. BieIWirth, 680 F.2d 263, 271 (2d Cir. 
1982). 
26. [d. § 1l04(a)(I)(B). 
27. [d. § 1l04(a)(I)(C). 
28. See supra note 3. 
29. EMPLOYEE BENEFITS RESEARCH INST., THE GALLUP ORG., INC., REpORT G-61, PUB-
LIC ATTITUDES ON INVESTMENT PREFERENCES 19 (1994) (sixty-two percent of survey 
respondents want to make their own retirement plan investment decisions). 
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many individual participants do not select a diversified range of 
investments for the retirement funds in their accounts. 30 
As of 1996, ERISA exempts employers from liability for invest-
ment losses when plan participants control the investment of their 
individual retirement plan accounts.31 This statutory exemption, 
commonly referred to as section 404(c) ofERISA,32 provides as fol-
lows: 
In the case of a pension plan which provides for individual 
accounts and permits a participant or beneficiary to exercise 
control over assets in his account, if a participant or benefici-
ary exercises control over the assets in his account (as 
determined under regulations of the Secretary)-
(A) such participant or beneficiary shall not be deemed to 
be a fiduciary by reason of such exercise, and 
(B) no person who is otherwise a fiduciary33 shall be liable 
under this part for any loss, or by reason of any breach, which 
results from such participant's or beneficiary's exercise of 
I 34 contro. 
Obviously, it was essential for the Department of Labor35 to issue 
regulations for an employer to qualify for the section 404(c) ex-
emption. Until that time, the employer's potential liability for 
participant directed investment losses was uncertain. These regula-
tions (404(c) Regulations) were finalized in 1992.36 
30. JACK VANDERHEI ET AL., EMPLOYEE BENEFITS RESEARCH INST., THE GALLUP ORG., 
INC., ISSUE BRIEF 218, 401 (K) PLAN AsSET ALLOCATION, ACCOUNT BALANCES, AND LOAN 
ACTIVITY IN 1998 12, 13 (2000); Medill, supra note 22, at 18-23. 
31. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(l) (Supp. II 1996). 
32. The Small BusinessJob Protection Act ofl996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1421(d)(2), 
110 Stat. 1755, 1799 (1996) (codified as 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (c)(I», amended ERISA, renum-
bering section 404(c) as section 404(c)(I). 
33. This reference to persons who are otherwise fiduciaries includes the named plan 
fiduciary, who is typically the sponsoring employer or union. 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a) (1994). It 
also includes other plan fiduciaries, such as the plan's trustee, under ERISA's general defi-
nition ofa fiduciary. [d. § 1002(21)(A). 
34. 29 U.S.C. § 1l04(c) (1) (emphasis added). 
35. The Secretary of Labor has administrative authority over the fiduciary provisions 
of Title I of ERISA. Reorganization Plan No.4 ofl978, 43 Fed. Reg. 47,713, 47,713 (Oct. 17, 
1978). The legislative history of section 404(c), discussed infra Part II.B.3.a., is scant. See 
H.R. CONF. REp. No. 93-1280, at 302-06 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.CAN. 5038, 5083-
85. 
36. Final Regulation Regarding Participant Directed Individual Account Plans, 57 Fed. 
Reg. 46,906, 46,906 (Oct. 13, 1992) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l). 
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Since the issuance of the final 404(c) Regulations, partICIpant 
directed 401 (k) plans have become increasingly popular with both 
employers and employees.37 In turn, national retirement policy has 
become increasingly dependent on 401 (k) plans. In 1984, the first 
year for which data is available, there were 7.5 million employees 
participating in 17,303 401 (k) plans sponsored by their employ-
ers.
S8 By 1995, the number of 401 (k) plans increased to 200,813, 
and the number of participating employees increased to 28 mil-
lion.39 In that same year, fifty-five percent of all contributions to 
employer-sponsored retirement plans were to 401 (k) plans.40 A 
1999 study of 491 companies found that forty-one percent of 
401 (k) plans represented the employee's primary source of re-
tirement income, an increase from thirty-five percent in 1995.41 
Significantly, almost all 401 (k) plans today allow plan participants 
to direct the investment of their 401 (k) plan retirement savings.42 
Before turning to the fiduciary responsibilities ERISA places on 
employers who sponsor 401 (k) plans, it is important to understand 
why the federal courts are just beginning to address these issues. 
The rise in popularity and prevalence of the 401 (k) plan has coin-
cided with the longest running bull market in the history of 
United States equity markets.43 Many new 401 (k) plan participants 
were inexperienced investors and wrongly believed they possessed 
the Midas touch. Satisfied employees, in turn, made for compla-
I 44 cent emp ayers. 
37. Employers favor 401 (k) plans because, unlike other types of retirement plans, they 
are funded by the employees themselves through salary deferrals. See supra note 3. Employ-
ees like 401 (k) plans because, unlike other types of retirement plans, the employee's 
retirement benefits are portable, and the employee has control over the level of her retire-
ment savings and the investment of the retirement funds. PENSION & WELFARE BENEFITS 
ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, STUDY OF 401(K) PLAN FEES AND EXPENSES § I (1998), avail-
able at http://www.dol.gov/dol/pwba. 
38. PENSION & WELFARE BENEFITS ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, PRIVATE PENSION 
PLAN BULL. 8, Abstract of 1995 Form 5500 Annual Reports, Table E23 (1999), http:// 
www.dol.gov/dol/pwba (last visited May 7, 2001). 
39. [d. 
40. SYLVESTER K. SCHIEBER ET AL., AM. COUNCIL FOR CAPITAL FORMATION & AsS'N OF 
PRiVATE PENSION & WELFARE PLANS, STRETCHING THE PENSION DOLLAR: IMPROVING U.S. 
RETIREMENT SECURITY AND NATIONAL SAVINGS BY ENHANCING EMPLOYER-BASED PENSIONS 
9 (1999). 
41. Hewitt Associates, Trends & Experience in 401(k) Plans (1999), at http:// 
www.hewittcom/hewitt (last visited on May 7, 2001) (on file with author). 
42. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. 2517, EMPLOYEE 
BENEFITS IN MEDIUM AND LARGE PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS, 1997, at 135 (1999), available at 
http://stats.bls.gov (last visited May 7, 2001) (eighty-six percent of 401 (k) plans permit the 
employee to choose investments for their plan contributions). 
43. See Clowes, supra note 4; Jacob M. Schlesinger, Change Agent: Haw Alan Greenspan 
Finally Came to Terms with the Stock Market, WALL ST. j., May 8, 2000, at AI. 
44. See Banham, supra note 8, at 69-70. 
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Today's stock market volatility has upset the equilibrium. AJ5 a 
result, employees are beginning to scrutinize their 401 (k) plans 
and to ask questions of their employers (and their own lawyers).45 
Employers, many for the first time, are examining nervously their 
ERISA fiduciary responsibilities and potential liability in sponsor-
ing 401 (k) plans.46 What both groups will find, unfortunately, IS a 
legal quagmire. 
II. EMPLOYER FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND THE 404(C) REGULATIONS 
A. Introduction to Litigation Scenarios 
The 404(c) Regulations require that for a 401 (k) plan part.J.cl-
pant to "exercise control" over the assets in her account, the plan 
must provide certain informational disclosures to the plan partici-
pants and must be designed to offer a broad range of diversified 
investment options. 47 To satisfy these requirements, 401 (k) plans 
usually offer mutual funds as plan investment options. 48 The result 
has been a significant growth in both mutual fund participation 
and investment in the stock market by the average American 
worker.49 
45. See id. at 70; Halverson, supra note 8, at 18. The Department of Labor's Pension 
and Welfare Benefits Administration actively encouraged employee scrutiny of their 401 (k) 
plans by issuing a nineteen page booklet titled A Look at 401(k) Plan Fees. PENSION & WEL-
FARE BENEFITS ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, A LOOK AT 401 (K) PLAN FEES ... FOR 
EMPLOYEES § 1 (1998), available at httpllwww.dol.gov/dol/pwba (last visited May 7,2001); 
see also Elizabeth White, DOL Issues Section 401(k) Fee Guide, Continues to Consider Further & 
quirements, 25 PENSIONS & BENEFITS REp. 1545 (1998). The booklet contains a checklist of 
ten questions for 401 (k) plan participants to ask their employers. PENSION & WELFARE 
BENEFITS ADMIN., supra, § 6. 
46. See Banham, supra note 8, at 70-74;Jacobius, supra note 9, at 61. 
47. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l (b) (2) (i), (b) (3) (i) (2000). 
48. See infra Part n.B.3.b. 
49. A mutual fund industry study conducted by the Investment Company Institute 
found that, in 1999, mutual funds constituted forty·five percent of all 401 (k) plan assets. 
Mutual Funds and the Retirement Market, FUNDAMENTALS: INVESTMENT COMPANY REs. IN 
BRIEF (Inv. Co. Inst.), May 2000, at 7, available at http://www.ici.org (last visited May 7, 
2001). In 1990, this figure was just nine percent. Id. Mutual fund investments today are the 
largest segment of 401 (k) plan assets. PENSION & WELFARE BENEFITS ADMIN., supra note 37, 
§ 2.4.1. A few 401 (k) plans are operated essentially like brokerage accounts that allow par· 
ticipants to invest in individual stocks. See Final Regulation Regarding Participant Directed 
Individual Account Plans, 57 Fed. Reg. 46,906, 46,921 (Oct. 13, 1992) (codified at 29 C.F.R. 
§ 2550.404c-l);Jon C. Chambers, Unrestricted Investment Accounts in Participant-Directed Plans: 
Problems and Solutions, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLAN REv., Aug. 1997, at 42,42 (discussing trend 
toward offering 401 (k) plan participants greater flexibility in investments choices offered 
through retirement plans); Aaron Lucchetti, Funds: Trading Comes to Retirement Plans, AsIAN 
WALL ST. J., July 25, 2000, at 21 (reporting on a survey showing that more workers want 
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The 404(c) Regulations also permit the employer to offer com-
pany stock as an investment option.50 A study of the investment 
choices made by 401 (k) plan participants indicates that when 
company stock is offered as an investment option, 32.7% of em-
ployees select it as one of their investments.51 A significant number 
of these employees invest heavily in company stock, which is an 
investment strategy fraught with risk. 52 
As 401 (k) plan investments, both mutual funds and company 
stock are subject to stock market volatility. Consequently, litigation 
between employers and employees involving 401 (k) plan invest-
ments is likely to arise under three scenarios. The first scenario 
involves a substantial and sustained downward correction in the 
stock market generally. The second scenario involves an employer 
who selects its own publicly traded company stock as an investment 
option for the 401 (k) plan. If the market value of the company 
stock declines, so will the retirement savings of those employees 
who invested in the stock through the 401 (k) plan. Under either 
of these first two scenarios, unhappy 401 (k) plan participants who 
sustain significant investment losses may sue the plan's sponsoring 
employer for breach of a fiduciary duty under ERISA.53 
their employers to offer a trading option as part of their 401 (k) plans). A recent study con-
ducted by the Profit Sharing/ 401 (k) Council of America found that ten percent of 401 (k) 
plans today offer such brokerage windows, up from one percent in 1993. Clifton Linton, 
Self-Directed 401 (k)s nxpand Investment Choices, at http://www.401kafe.com (last visited May 7, 
2001) (on file with author). 
50. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l (b) (3). 
51. VANDERHEI ET AL., supra note 30, at II (tbI.5); see also Medill, supra note 22, at 20-
23 (discussing results of older studies on investment plans with company stock options). As 
of 1995, of the $773,941,000,000 in total assets held in 401 (k) plans, $II4,370,OOO,OOO, or 
14.8%, were employer securities. PENSION & WELFARE BENEFITS ADMIN., supra note 38, at 
tbl.D6. A more recent private survey of employers found that as of 1997, thirty-seven percent 
of 401 (k) plans offered company stock as an investment option. PENSION & WELFARE BENE-
FITS ADMIN., supra note 37, § 2.4.3. 
52. Dr. John H. Langbein, Reforming ERISA Investment Law, Statement at a Hearing 
Before the Subcommittee on Employer-Employee Relations of the House Committee on 
Education and the Workforce, 106th Congo (Feb. 15,2000) [hereinafter Reforming ERISA] 
(on file with author); Christine Dugas, Don't Bank 40I(k) Empluyer's Stock, If Company Hits Bad 
Spot, Retirement Plan Can Tank, USA TODAY, Aug. 4, 2000, at 3B;Jane Bryant Quinn, Empluy 
Caution with Company Stock, WASH. POST, July 2, 2000, at H2; John Rekenthaler, The Truth 
About Company Stock, THE 401 (K) WIRE, July 13, 2000, at http://www.401kWire.com (last 
visited on May 7, 2001) (on file with author). Professor Susan Stabile has criticized large 
investments in employer stock as a form of double jeopardy for the plan participant. In the 
event the employer becomes insolvent, the employee who invested heavily in the employer's 
stock will have lost both his current income and his retirement savings. Susan]. Stabile, 
Pension Plan Investments in Empluyer Securities: More Is Not Always Better, 15 YALE]. ON REG. 61, 
79 (1998). 
53. For a discussion of potential ERISA claims and remedies for these litigation sce-
narios, see infra Parts II.B., III. 
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The third litigation scenario contemplates a continued spectacu-
lar rise in the stock market. Under this scenario, the participants' 
401 (k) plan investments do not lose money; rather, the partici-
pants' complaint is that the employer invested their 401 (k) plan 
money too conservatively in a safe, but low-earning, money market 
mutual fund. As a result, their 401 (k) plan accounts did not earn 
as much as they otherwise would have if the employer had invested 
more broadly in the stock market. The participants' alleged injury 
is one of a lost opportunity to share in the stock market's overall 
rise. This third scenario is made possible by a new and growing 
trend in the world of 401 (k) plans: the development of the so-
called "automatic enrollment" 401 (k) plan. 
In resolving these claims, the federal courts must, of course, de-
fer to any reasonable Department of Labor interpretation of 
ERISA's statutory language if a court determines that the statute is 
silent or ambiguous on the issue.54 Consequently, in describing the 
current state of ERISA fiduciary law below, relevant Department of 
Labor regulations and official pronouncements are incorporated. 
What will become evident is that the Department of Labor, at key 
policy junctures, effectively delegated its own policy-making 
authority with respect to 401 (k) plans to the federal courts. 
B. Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claims Against the Emplayer 
In its official commentary accompanying the 404(c) Regula-
tions, the Department of Labor took pains to make clear that an 
employer's failure to comply with the requirements of the 404(c) 
Regulations is not, in itself, a breach of fiduciary duty by the em-
ployer.55 Consequently, the initial burden under all the litigation 
scenarios falls on the 401 (k) plan participants to prove that the 
54. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984) 
(holding that, when a statute is silent or ambiguous on a specific issue, courts should give 
deference to a reasonable interpretation adopted by the agency entrusted with administer-
ing the statute); Herman v. Nationsbank Trust Co., 126 F.3d 1354, 1363 (11th Cir. 1997) 
("Unless Congress, in enacting ERISA, demonstrated clearly its intent with regard to the 
questions before us, we must defer to the Secretary's official interpretations of ERISA if they 
are reasonable."); cf Sayles, supra note 6, at 1493-98 (arguing that the federal courts should 
impose an affirmative fiduciary duty of disclosure on employers beyond ERISA's § 404(c) 
regulatory requirements). 
55. Final Regulation Regarding Participant Directed Individual Account Plans, 57 Fed. 
Reg. 46,906, 46,906-07 (Oct. 13, 1992) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l). 
482 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 34:3 
plan's sponsoring employer breached one or more of its statutory 
fiduciary duties under ERISA section 404(a).56 
Participants in 401 (k) plans are likely to allege three possible 
violations of the employer's fiduciary duties: breach of the em-
ployer's duty of prudence; breach of the employer's duty of loyalty; 
or breach of the employer's duty of prudent diversification of plan 
assets. The employer's duties of prudence and loyalty are discussed 
below in Subparts B1 and 2. The employer's duty of prudent diver-
sification of plan assets is discussed in Subpart 3 in connection with 
the 404 (c) Regulations. 
1. The Employer's Duty of Prudence in Selecting 401(k) Plan Invest-
ment options 
a. Established Legal Standards-ERISA section 404(a)(1)(B) re-
quires the employer to discharge his duties with respect to a plan: 
with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circum-
stances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like 
capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the con-
duct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims.57 
The legislative history states that lawmakers "expect[ed] that the 
courts will interpret this prudent man rule (and the other fiduciary 
56. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1994). ERISA's statute of limitations for breach of fiduci-
ary duty claims is unlikely to present a serious obstacle to the types of claims described in 
this Article. Under ERISA section 413, a breach of fiduciary duty claim against the employer 
must be brought within the earlier of: 
(1) six years after (A) the date of the last action which constituted a part of the 
breach or violation, or (B) in the case of an omission, the latest date on which the fi-
duciary could have cured the breach or violation, or 
(2) three years after the earliest date on which the plaintiff had actual knowledge of 
the breach or violation; 
except that in the case of fraud or concealment, such action may be commenced not 
later than six years after the date of discovery of such breach or violation. 
29 U.S.C. § 1113 (1994). The federal courts construe strictly the actual knowledge require-
ment of ERISA section 413(2) that triggers the shorter three year statute of limitations 
period. Brown v. Am. Life Holdings, Inc., 190 F.3d 856, 859 (8th Cir. 1999) (summarizing 
caselaw); Gluck v. Unisys Corp., 960 F.2d 1168, 1178 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that actual 
knowledge requires more than mere knowledge that the transaction giving rise to the al-
leged breach occurred). The federal courts also have used the "continuing breach" theory 
effectively to extend the statute of limitations period. E.g., Starr v. lCI Data Processing, Inc., 
767 F. Supp. 633, 636-38 (D.N]. 1991); Dole v. Formica, 14 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 
1397,1405-06 (N.D. Ohio 1991) (finding that each time the plans paid an excessive admin-
istrative fee, the plans were harmed and a new cause of action arose). 
57. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1)(B). 
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standards) bearing in mind the special nature and purpose of em-
ployee benefit plans.,,58 Thus, from the outset, Congress 
contemplated that the federal courts would incorporate policy 
considerations into their analysis of ERISA's fiduciary duty stan-
dards. 
Traditionally, ERISA cases interpreting the employer's duty of 
prudence have arisen when an investment manager or other plan 
fiduciary, rather than the employees, has selected and managed 
the plan's investments.59 Nevertheless, several general principles 
applicable to today's participant directed 401 (k) plan emerge from 
that well-developed body of judicial precedent. 
First, an employer's subjective good faith is not a defense-"a 
'pure heart and an empty head are not enough" to satisfy the duty 
of prudence.6o Second, prudence is to be evaluated based on the 
circumstances at the time a decision is made.61 In particular, the 
eventual investment result, good or bad, does not establish com-
pliance with or a breach of the duty of prudence.62 Third, the 
58. H.R. CONF. REp. No. 93-1280, at 302 (1974), reprinted in 1974 V.S.C.C.A.N. 5038, 
5083; see also Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 V.S. 489, 497 (1996); Donovan v. Cunningham, 716 
F.2d 1455, 1464 (5th Cir. 1983); H.R. REp. No. 93-533, at 13 (1974), reprinted in 1974 
V.s.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4650; S. REp. No. 93-127, at 29 (1974), reprinted in 1974 V.S.C.C.A.N. 
4838,4865. . 
59. SeeGIW Indus., Inc. v. Trevor, Stewart, Burton &Jacobsen, Inc., 895 F.2d 729, 730-
31 (llth Cir. 1990); Fink v. Nat'l Sav. & Trust Co., 772 F.2d 951, 953-56 (D.C. Cir. 1985); 
Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d 270, 273-80 (2d Cir. 1984); Donovan v. Mazzola, 716 F.2d 1226, 
1228-31 (9th Cir. 1983). An exception is the case of In re Unisys Savings Plan Litigation, 21 
Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2514,2516 (E.D. Pa. 1997), where the participants alleged 
that the employer breached its duty of prudence in purchasing guaranteed investment 
contracts (GICs) from Executive Life Insurance Company of California (Executive Life). 
The Executive Life GICs constituted approximately fifteen to twenty percent of one of the 
investment options in these participant directed retirement plans, one of which was a 
401(k) plan. Id. at 2516-17,2518,2530 (findings offact numbers I, 5,15, and 79). When 
Executive Life later was placed into conservatorship by California insurance company regu-
lators, the GICs eventually paid a lower rate of interest than called for in the purchase 
contract. In re Vnisys Sav. Plan Litig., 173 F.3d 145, 150 (3d Cir. 1999). Although the In re 
Unisys case applies the employer's duty of prudence in the context of a participant directed 
401 (k) plan, its factual setting is unusual. The case does not address the more common 
types of factual situations presented in this Article. The case also predates the effective date 
of the final 404(c) Regulations. See Final Regulation Regarding Participant Directed Indi-
vidual Account Plans, 57 Fed. Reg. 46,906, 46,906 (Oct. 13, 1992) (codified at 29 C.F.R. 
§ 2550.404c-l). 
60. Donovan v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455, 1467 (5th Cir. 1983). 
61. In re Vnisys Sav. Plan Litig., 74 F.3d 420, 434 (3d Cir. 1996); Katsaros, 744 F.2d at 
279; see also DeBruyne v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 720 F. Supp. 1342, 1349 (N.D. III. 
1989) (stating "fiduciary duty of care requires prudence, not prescience"). 
62. In re Unisys, 74 F.3d at 434 (stating that the court is to focus on "a fiduciary's con-
duct in arriving at an investment decision, not on its results"); Roth v. Sawyer-Cleator 
Lumber Co., 16 F.3d 915, 918 (8th Cir. 1994) (stating the "prudent person standard is not 
concerned with results"); Marshall v. Glass/Metal Ass'n & Glaziers, 507 F. Supp. 378, 384 
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employer may need to seek the assistance of outside experts prior 
to making plan investment decisions. 63 
The duty of prudence has both objective and subjective compo-
nents.64 Subjectively, it is well established that the duty of prudence 
generally requires the employer to conduct a thorough investiga-
tion prior to making an investment decision. 65 The regulations 
describe this employer duty as follows: 
With regard to an investment or investment course of action 
taken by a fiduciary of an employee benefit plan pursuant to 
his investment duties, the requirements of section 
404(a) (1) (B) of the Act ... are satisfied if the fiduciary: 
(i) Has given appropriate consideration to those facts and cir-
cumstances that ... the fiduciary knows or should know are 
relevant to the particular investment or investment course of 
action involved, including the role the investment or invest-
ment course of action plays in that portion of the plan's 
investment portfolio with respect to which the fiduciary has 
investment duties; and 
(ii) Has acted accordingly.66 
In evaluating the objective merits of an investment, "appropriate 
consideration" 
include[s], but is not necessarily limited to, 
(i) A determination by the fiduciary that the particular in-
vestment or investment course of action is reasonably 
designed, as part of the portfolio ... to further the purposes 
of the plan, taking into consideration the risk of loss and the 
opportunity for gain ... associated with the investment or in-
vestment course of action, and 
(D. Haw. 1980) (noting "even the most carefully evaluated investments can fail while un-
promising investments may succeed"). 
63. Martin v. Feilen, 965 F.2d 660, 670-71 (8th Cir. 1992); Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 
F.2d 263, 272-73 (2d Cir. 1982); Donovan v. Tricario, 5 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 
2057,2064 (S.D. Fla. 1984). The employer cannot, however, rely blindly on the recommen-
dations of an outside expert. Howard v. Shay, 100 F.3d 1484, 1489 (9th Cir. 1996); 
Cunningham, 716 F.2d at 1474; Mazzola, 716 F.2d at 1234. 
64. Fink, 772 F.2d at 962 ("In short, there are two related but distinct duties imposed 
upon a trustee: to investigate and evaluate investments, and to invest prudently.") (Scalia,]., 
concurring and dissenting); Whitfield v. Cohen, 682 F. Supp. 188, 195 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
65. In re Unisys, 74 F.3d at 434; Katsaros, 744 F.2d at 279. 
66. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-l (b) (1) (2000). 
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(ii) Consideration of the following factors ... 
(A) The composition of the portfolio with regard to di-
versification; 
(B) The liquidity and current return of the portfolio 
relative to the anticipated cash flow requirement of the 
plan; and 
(C) The projected return of the portfolio relative to the 
funding objectives of the plan.67 
Finally, the federal courts have long viewed duty of prudence as a 
highly flexible standard, to be "evaluated in light of the 'character 
and aims' of the particular type of plan [the fiduciary] serves.,,68 
Many of these general principles, developed in the context of 
plans where a fiduciary selected the plan's investments, can be 
transferred to today's participant directed 401 (k) plan. The logical 
corollary in the 401 (k) plan setting is the employer's selection of 
investment menu options from which the participants will make 
their investment choices. The Department of Labor imposes 
minimal requirements for the range of investment options that 
must be offered in participant directed 401 (k) plans.69 As a result, 
the employer has broad discretion in selecting these investment 
options. 
This exercise of employer discretion in selecting the investment 
options for the 401 (k) plan is a fiduciary function subject to the 
general duty of prudence. In the official commentary to the 404(c) 
Regulations, the Department of Labor emphasized that 
the act of designating investment alternatives ... in an ERISA 
section 404(c) plan is a fiduciary function to which the limita-
tion on liability provided by section 404(c) is not applicable. 
All of the fiduciary provisions of ERISA remain applicable to 
both the initial designation of investment alternatives ... and 
the ongoing determination that such alternatives ... remain 
suitable and prudent alternatives for the plan.70 
67. Id. § 2550.404a·l (b) (2). 
68. In re Unisys, 74 F.3d at 434 (quoting Cunningham, 716 F.2d at 1467). 
69. See infra II.B.3. 
70. Final Regulation Regarding Participant Directed Individual Account Plans, 57 Fed. 
Reg. 46,906, 46,922 (Oct. 13, 1992) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l); see also Office of 
Pension & Welfare Benefit Programs, Dep't of Labor, Op. Ltr. 98-06A Uuly 30,1998). 
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Thus, compliance with the 404(c) Regulations is not a defense 
to an employer's breach of the duty of prudence (or duty of loy-
alty'l) in selecting and monitoring the 401 (k) plan's menu of 
investment options. 
An employer, of course, may argue that its selection of invest-
ment options for the 401 (k) plan is a plan design decision made in 
the employer's nonfiduciary capacity as "settlor" of the plan. 72 
However, in interpreting this employer duty as a fiduciary one, the 
Department of Labor anticipated and expressly rejected the settlor 
function argument. The federal courts should do likewise.'3 
b. Policy Choices: Employer Burden Versus Participant Protection-
The following hypothetical and discussion introduce application of 
the duty of prudence to the employer's selection of investment op-
tions in a 401 (k) plan. This hypothetical is used and developed 
throughout the Article to articulate the broad policy considera-
tions that the federal courts face in interpreting and applying 
ERISA's fiduciary provisions to 401 (k) plans. 
FIRST HYPOTHETICAL 
Employer decides to establish a participant directed 401 (k) plan. Em-
ployer goes to Full Service Provider, who furnishes both the necessary 
plan documents and administrative services for the 401 (k) plan. The 
Full Service Provider also sponsors various mutual funds that are po-
tential investment options under the plan. Employer selects seven of 
these mutual funds-four equity funds, two bond funds, and a 
money market fund-as the investment options for the 401 (k) plan. 
The question presented to the federal court is whether Employer has 
satisfied its fiduciary duty of prudence in selecting these investment 
options. 
The first hypothetical represents the most common approach to 
401 (k) plan sponsorship by employers. All but the largest employ-
71. See infra Part II.B.2. 
72. See discussion of the settlor function doctrine infra Part II.B.2.e. 
73. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. At least one high-ranking Department of 
Labor official has implied that an employer's decision to discontinue a plan investment op-
tion may be treated as an employer settlor function immune from fiduciary responsibility 
under ERISA. England, supra note 8, at 73 (comments of Alan Lebowitz, Deputy Assistant 
Secretary, Pension & Welfare Benefits Admin.). ERISA's "anti-cutback" rule, which prohibits 
the taking away of vested accrued benefits, does not apply to a 401 (k) plan's menu of in· 
vestment options. See infra note 185. 
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ers who sponsor 401 (k) plans generally use what is known as a "full 
service provider" for "one-stop shopping" in establishing and ad-
ministering their 401 (k) plans. 74 The hypothetical "Full Service 
Provider" represents the mutual fund companies, large banks, and 
insurance companies who offer these services.75 
The question presented to the federal court in this hypothetical 
introduces the first set of broad policy choices that arise in 401 (k) 
plan fiduciary litigation. On one hand, ERISA makes retirement 
plan sponsorship by employers voluntary.76 Consequently, the fidu-
ciary duties (and corresponding potential liability for breach) 
imposed upon employers should not be made so burdensome that 
employers will be deterred from offering retirement plans to their 
employees. 77 On the other hand, a principal purpose of ERISA's 
fiduciary provisions is to protect the integrity of plan assets and the 
retirement plan benefits provided to plan participants.78 The more 
stringently these fiduciary duties are enforced, the greater the pro-
tection to plan participants. This first set of policy choices is 
referred to as "employer burden versus participant protection." 
Employer burden is a particularly sensitive policy concern in the 
401 (k) plan context. The statistical trends show that 401 (k) plans 
are quickly becoming the most prevalent type of retirement plan 
offered by employers.79 Larger and more well-established employ-
ers tend to offer 401 (k) plans in addition to other types of 
retirement plans.80 But smaller and newer employers tend to offer 
only 401 (k) plans.81 For this latter group in particular, the only vi-
able economic choice may be between offering employees a 
401 (k) plan or no retirement plan at al1.82 Consequently, a poten-
tial policy concern is whether imposing too great of a fiduciary 
burden may deter these smaller employers from offering 401 (k) 
74. PENSION & WELFARE BENEFITS ADMIN., supra note 37, § 2.7 (reporting that eighty-
five percent of 401 (k) plans with fewer than 250 participants and seventy-five percent of 
401 (k) plans with 250 to 1,000 participants use a full senoice provider). 
75. See id. 
76. H.R. REp. No. 93-533, at 1 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.CAN. 4639, 4639; see 
also In re Unisys Sav. Plan Litig., 74 F.3d 420, 434 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that one of 
ERISA's underlying purposes is to encourage the development of private retirement plans). 
77. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 497 (1996). 
78. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994); In re Unisys, 74 F.3d at 434; H.R. REp. No. 93-533, at 1 
(1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.CAN. 4639, 4639; S. REp. No. 93-127, at 29 (1974) reprinted 
in 1974 U.S.C.CAN. 4838, 4865. 
79. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text. 
80. See PENSION & WELFARE BENEFITS ADMIN., supra note 38, at tbl.D4. 
81. Id. 
82. PAUL YAKOBOSKI ET AL., EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., THE GALLUP ORG., 
INC., ISSUE BRIEF No. 212, THE 1999 SMALL EMPLOYER RETIREMENT SURVEY; BUILDING A 
BETTER MOUSETRAP Is NOT ENOUGH 3 (1999) (finding that only thirty-one percent of indi-
viduals who work for employers having fewer than 100 employees have a retirement plan). 
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plans to their employees, thereby leaving these employees without 
a retirement plan. 
A recent survey of small employers by the Employee Benefits 
Research Institute attempted to discern the reasons why this par-
ticular group sponsored or refused to sponsor retirement plans for 
their workers.83 Contrary to the conventional wisdom, the survey 
results suggest that the administrative costs associated with plan 
sponsorship are not a dominant factor in the small employer's de-
cision.84 Rather, the two most important factors are the competitive 
advantage that offering a retirement plan gave the employer in 
employee recruitment and retention, and the positive effect on 
employee attitude and performance.85 
This information concerning small employer behavior is impor-
tant because the employer's fiduciary duty of prudence will impact 
the employer's cost of plan sponsorship. The survey evidence indi-
cates that the federal courts need not set the standard for 
prudence unnecessarily low out of a fear of chilling future 401 (k) 
plan sponsorship among small employers because competitive ad-
vantage, not altruism, plays the greatest role in employer's 
decisions to sponsor 401 (k) plans. In the 401 (k) plan setting, pru-
dent investigation in the beginning is relatively inexpensive, 
whereas protracted fiduciary litigation (and potential employer 
liability) after the fact is not. What is needed are clear guidelines from 
the federal courts to the employee benefits community delineating 
the employer's duty of prudence in selecting the investment op-
tions for a 401 (k) plan.86 
Participant protection, too, has an important policy role in the 
401 (k) plan setting. A 401 (k) plan that offers employees a carefully 
selected range of investment options is likely to maximize the po-
tential for achieving retirement income security.87 At retirement, a 
401 (k) plan participant's benefit will be the balance of her plan 
account, much which will be attributable to the tax-deferred com-
pounding of investment earnings over a long period of time.88 
Consequently, the returns generated by the investment options 
available to the participant under the plan will playa large role in 
determining her retirement benefit. Conversely, fees and expenses 
83. Id. at l. 
84. Id. at 5. 
85. Id. at 6-7. 
86. SeeJacobius, supra note 9, at 6l. 
87. Lucchetti, supra note 49. 
88. See Daniel I. Halperin, Special Tax Treatment for Emplnyer-Based Retirement Programs: Is 
It "StiU" Viable as a Means of Increasing Retirement Income?, 49 TAX L. REv. 1-2 n.4 (1993); see 
also JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAw 229-32 
(3d ed. 2000). 
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charged to the participant's account will erode significantly her 
investment earnings and, ultimately, the amount of her retirement 
benefit.H9 
c. Policy Analysis: Employer's Duty of Prudence in Selecting Investment 
options-The greatest challenge facing the federal courts in 401 (k) 
plan fiduciary litigation will be interpreting and applying an estab-
lished body of legal precedent, the ERISA fiduciary duties, to a 
new and unforeseen context. This task requires a fresh look at the 
legal standards used to evaluate fiduciary conduct under ERISA. 
In the discussion below, established legal standards for evaluat-
ing an employer's duty of prudence are reframed in the form of a 
question. Each question represents the same basic query: How 
should this legal standard apply to 401 (k) plans? Following each 
question is a discussion and analysis of the competing policy con-
siderations that the federal courts may want to consider in 
determining how the established legal standard should be applied 
in the 401 (k) plan context. 
Should the Employer have consulted an outside expert before selecting 
the 401(k) plan's mutual fund investment options? Or does the Em-
ployer have the in-house expertise to make investment selections? 
Case law indicates that the duty of prudence requires an em-
ployer who lacks investment expertise to seek outside expertise 
before investing the assets of the plan.90 But is there a compelling 
policy reason to change this standard when the employer is select-
ing the investment options that will be available to 401 (k) plan 
participants? The importance of the employer'S decision to the 
ultimate value of the 401 (k) plan's retirement benefits is obvious.91 
But is the corresponding burden on the employer so great that it 
justifies lowering the standard? Here employer size is a factor mer-
iting consideration. In general, large employers are more likely to 
have sufficient in-house investment expertise to prudently select a 
range of investment options for the 401 (k) plan. Consequently, 
the real impact of the duty is most likely to fall on smaller employ-
ers. 
A Department of Labor industry advisory group (Working 
Group) has indicated that the first question a plan fiduciary should 
ask itself when selecting a service provider is, "What service or 
89. See infra pp. 492-95, 503 and notes 104, 15l. 
90. See supra note 63. 
91. See supra note 88. 
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expertise does the plan need?,,92 The real problem, hinted at by the 
first hypothetical, is that many employers, but particularly small 
employers, are heavily reliant on their 401 (k) service providers. 93 
This practice underlies a significant, yet unanswered, policy 
question: Should a "suggestion" of investment options made by a 
representative of the service provider satisfy the Employer's fiduciary duty to 
seek outside expertise? The Department of Labor's Working Group 
does not address this question. Analysis of this policy question at 
this juncture is premature, as several additional factors must first 
be considered. 
Should the Employer have considered and compared· various Full 
Service Providers before reaching a decision? 
Common sense dictates that the employer consider and com-
pare two or more service providers before settling on one to assist 
the employer in servicing the 401 (k) plan and, more importantly, 
furnishing the plan's investment options. Mter all, in handling 
their own affairs, people generally do not buy the first car they see, 
nor the first house they are shown. They shop, they compare, and 
then they choose. Selecting a service provider for a 401 (k) plan is a 
fiduciary function,94 historically subject to '" [n] ot honesty alone, 
but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, ... [as] the stan-
d d f b h . , ,,95 ar 0 e aVlOr. 
Yet the Department of Labor's Working Group found that 
[m]any of the problems with respect to service providers arise 
because the responsible plan fiduciary either does not under-
stand his role and responsibility in the selection and 
monitoring of service providers or exercises poor judgment 
because he does not have experience or an appropriate 
source of information concerning legal requirements and in-
d . 96 ustry practIces. 
This finding, made by the Working Group in 1996, appears to 
be primarily directed at problems arising in the context of single-
92. ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EMPLOYEE WELFARE & PENSION BENEFIT PUNS, U.S. DEP'T 
OF LABOR, REpORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON GUIDANCE IN SELECTING AND MONITORING 
SERVICE PROVIDERS § V.A.1 (1996), available at http://www.dol.gov/dol/pwba/public/ 
adcoun/srvpro.htm (last visited May 7, 2001) [hereinafter ADVISORY COUNCIL]. 
93. See supra note 74. 
94. ADVISORY COUNCIL, supra note 92, § III. 
95. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.s. 211, 224 (2000) (quoting Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 
N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928». 
96. ADVISORY COUNCIL, supra note 92, § III. 
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employer defined benefit plans.97 Since that time, however, the 
regulations indicate that this basic fiduciary responsibility also ap-
plies in the context of selecting and monitoring the service 
provider for a 401 (k) plan.98 
Did the Employer consider and compare the historical rates of return 
offered by various investment options? Their volatility? Their liquid-
ity? The fees and expenses charged by the Full Service Provider to plan 
participants? Does the overall ''package'' of investment options offered 
by the plan offer a participant the ability to construct a diversified 
portfolio? 
Requiring the employer to evaluate such factors as historical 
rates of return, liquidity, and volatility in selecting investment op-
tions is not as burdensome as it may first appear. The 404(c) 
Regulations in effect require the employer to consider these fac-
tors.99 This information is readily available, if requested, from the 
service provider who will provide the investment options for the 
401 (k) plan. 1oo The employer, however, may not have the invest-
ment expertise to analyze prudently this information. 
In contrast, information concerning the fees and expenses 
charged to the plan participants may prove difficult to obtain and 
even more difficult to analyze and compare. The Department of 
Labor's Working Group recommends that a plan fiduciary ask the 
following question when selecting a service provider: "Are the serv-
ice provider's fees reasonable when compared to industry 
standards in view of the services to be performed, the provider's 
qualifications and the scope of the service provider's responsibil-
ity?,,101 Yet a 1998 Department of Labor study of 401 (k) plan fees 
and expenses found that obtaining such information is difficult. 
The costs of 401 (k) plan services are somewhat dependent 
on the information that a plan sponsor has about the range of 
prices in the marketplace that are charged by these providers. 
A search of the literature shows that gaining visibility of the 
universe of thousands of service providers would be difficult 
to impossible for any plan sponsor with limited resources. For 
example, Valletta (February 1997) estimates that there are in 
97. [d. 
98. 29 C.F.R. § 2509.96-1 (e) (2000). 
99. See infra Part II.B.3.h. 
100. See PENSION & WELFARE BENEFITS ADMIN., supra note 45, § 8. 
101. ADVISORY COUNCIL, supra note 92, § V.A.4. 
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excess of 1500 third party administrators and over 3,000 firms 
offering asset management services to 401 (k) plans. 
The directories cited offer only a small segment of the avail-
able vendors, although the majority of the larger providers 
are displayed. For example, the 401(k) Provider Directory, one 
of the best known, only contains information about 94 of the 
larger full service providers (HR Investment Consultants). 
The other directory located in the literature search, the 
(k)form Catalog, contains information about both full service 
providers as well as TP As [third party administrators] and al-
liances. However, the (k)form Catalog lists only 79 such 
providers. (The publisher states that these 79 providers serv-
ice over 50% of 401 (k) plans in the country.) 
Information about service providers is also available from as-
sociations, advertising, and the Internet. In addition, the 
401 (k) plan provider industry is very aggressively seeking to 
make their services known, frequently through well structured 
sales networks. However, the plan sponsor relying solely on 
information furnished by those service providers that estab-
lish contact through a sales force, would have incomplete 
knowledge of the marketplace. 
The foregoing discussion suggests that the market for 
401 (k) plan services is not particularly efficient for the plans 
that do not have the resources or interest to search for infor-
mation that would allow a comparison of available services 
d . 102 an pnces. 
Although obtaining comparable data on fees and expenses is 
burdensome to the employer, the need to protect plan participants 
may be even greater. The Department of Labor's 1998 study found 
that "a substantial portion of 401 (k) plan fees and expenses are 
charged against the account balances of plan participants and that 
this trend is increasing.,,103 The study described the implications of 
this trend as follows: 
102. PENSION & WELFARE BENEFITS ADMIN., supra note 37, § 2.7.4; see also id. § 3.7 
(discussing whether plan sponsors and participants are adequately infonned about fees and 
expenses); Terry R. O'Neill, It Pays to Knaw About Both Qualified and Nonqualified Programs, 
EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLAN REv., Apr. 1,2000, at 41,42 (describing when 401(k) plan fees 
may be hidden); Stephen B. Whipple, 401(k): Savings Plan or SheU Game?, A.B.A. BANKING J., 
Apr. 1,2000, at 79,79 (same). 
103. PENSION & WELFARE BENEFITS ADMIN., supra note 37, §§ I, 3.6. 
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Expenses of operating and maintaining an investment port-
folio that are debited against the participant's account 
constitute an opportunity cost in the form of foregone in-
vestments in every contribution period. The laws of 
compound interest dictate that these small reductions in in-
vestment are magnified greatly over the decades in which 
many employees will be 401 (k) plan participants. Observers 
have concluded that some plan providers are charging as 
much as 100 basis points in fees and expenses over the pre-
vailing average rates (citation omitted). The effect of such 
higher levels of expenses would be to reduce the value of po-
tential future account balances for these participants. 
An example in Forbes Magazine shows this effect. Two em-
ployees each contribute the same amount annually into 
mutual funds. The funds each return 9% annually, but one 
has an expense ratio of 0.2% while the other has an expense 
ratio of 1.2%, a difference of 100 basis points. At the end of 
35 years, the less expensive fund has a balance 23% higher 
than the other (citation omitted). 
Some observers postulate that some plans are paying fees 
and expenses that are too high. Evidence for this conclusion 
is offered by studies that show extraordinary variance in price 
quotations given by providers for essentially comparable serv-
ices (citations omitted). It has been argued by these observers 
that, when a plan incurs higher fees and expenses, the plan 
sponsor has not exercised adequate care in selecting and 
monitoring the plan's service providers. 
A second issue of concern to many observers is that sponsors 
(and participants) lack adequate information on the structure 
and extent of fees and expenses to make informed choices 
about service providers and investment options. Thus, the in-
adequate disclosure of information may be a factor in the 
existence of the large variance in fees and expenses of 401 (k) 
I 104 pans. 
The Department of Labor study found that the single largest 
type of expense being charged to 401 (k) plan participants was in-
10' 
vestment management fees. ' Investment management fees are 
104. Id. § I. 
105. Id. § 3.3.4. 
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deducted at the mutual fund level to compensate the service pro-
vider for managing the assets held in the mutual fund. 106 The study 
found that investment management fees exceed eighty percent of 
a typical 401 (k) plan's total fees and expenses. 107 
The potential for mischief when an employer relies on a service 
provider representative for expert advice in selecting plan invest-
ment options should now be evident. Although the Securities and 
Exchange Commission requires disclosure of investment manage-
ment fees/OS such disclosure may be meaningless to an employer. 
Are the fees high, average, or low for the industry? The service 
provider representative may know the answer to this question, but 
it may not be in the representative's self-interest (or the interest of 
the representative's employer, the service provider) to opine on 
the subject. If fees are disclosed as relatively high, the service pro-
vider may lose a customer, and the representative may lose a sale.lOg 
Does this mean that 401 (k) plan participants should go unpro-
tected? Can the burden on the employer to investigate fees and 
expenses be mitigated? The answer to both of these questions lies 
in full disclosure of industry standards for 401 (k) plan fees and 
expenses. Today's employer does not need to investigate inde-
pendently industry standards for fees and expenses, since the 
Department of Labor compiled and posted this information on the 
• 110 h th· d d 111 W·th l' 11 Internet, as ave 0 er In epen ent sources. lItera y one 
click, the employer can evaluate whether the fees and expenses of 
the service provider are "low," "high," or "average" when com-
pared to industry standards. In addition, the Department of Labor 
developed a standardized questionnaire to assist employers in mak-
ing meaningful comparisons of the fees and expenses charged by 
various 401 (k) plan service providers. 1I2 
106. Id. Due to ERISA's complex prohibited transaction rules, receipt of these invest-
ment management fees prevents the plan service provider from providing investment 
advice to the 401 (k) plan participants. See generally Medill, supra note 22, at 38-46 
(discussing ERISA's prohibited transaction rules and exemptions). 
107. PENSION & WELFARE BENEFITS ADMIN., supra note 37, § 3.3.4. 
108. Id. § 2.4.1.1; Medill, supra note 22, at 44-46 and accompanying notes. 
109. Indeed, the founder and former chief executive officer of Vanguard Group has 
criticized publicly the greed, in the form of higher fees, that has invaded the mutual fund 
industry. John C. Bogle, How Mutual Funds Lost Their Way, WALL ST. j., June 20, 2000, at 
A26. 
110. PENSION & WELFARE BENEFITS ADMIN., supra note 37, § 4.2-.3. 
Ill. E.g., Sue Stevens, So What IS a Reasonable Fee?, THE 401 (K) WIRE, June 7, 2000, at 
http://www.401kWire.com (summarizing data compiled using Morningstar software) (last 
visited May 7,2001) (on file with author). 
112. See infra notes 165-66 and accompanying text. 
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Service provider fees and expenses charged that border on the 
abusive are now a Department of Labor enforcement priority."3 
The federal courts should consider the growing availability of this 
information in determining whether an employer has acted pru-
dently. 
Did the Employer periodically review the plan '5 investment options to 
determine if they should continue to be offered or instead should be 
changed? 
The Department of Labor's position is that the employer has an 
ongoing fiduciary duty to monitor the investment options offered 
under the 401 (k) plan. 
[T]he Department points out that the act of limiting or des-
ignating investment options which are intended to constitute 
all or part of the investment universe of an ERISA 404(c) plan 
is a fiduciary function which, whether achieved through fidu-
ciary designation or express plan language, is not a direct or 
necessary result of any participant direction of such plan. Thus, 
for example, in the case of look-through investment vehicles 
[mutual funds], the plan fiduciary has a fiduciary obligation to 
prudently select such vehicles, as well as a residual fiduciary obli-
gation to periodically evaluate the peiformance of such vehicles to 
determine, based upon that evaluation, whether the vehicles should con-
tinue to be available as participant investment options. 114 
There are sound policy reasons underlying this duty to monitor 
the plan's investment options. As John Bogle, founder and former 
chief executive officer of Vanguard Group observes: 
During the 1990s, 55% of equity funds failed, almost four 
times the 14% failure rate of the 1960s. Should the recent 
failure rate hold, 2,500 of today's 4,500 equity funds won't be 
around in 2010. 115 
The employer's fiduciary duty to periodically review the 401 (k) 
plan's investment options raises the hidden policy question posed 
113. See infra note 152 and accompanying text. 
114. Final Regulation Regarding Participant Directed Individual Account Plans, 57 Fed. 
Reg. 46,906, 46,924 n.27 (Oct. 13, 1992) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1) (emphasis 
added). 
115. Bogle, supra note 109. Insurance companies, too, are subject to failure. See supra 
note 59 discussing In re Unisys. 
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at the beginning of this section. If an employer lacks the expertise 
to evaluate a plan's investment options, is it prudent for the em-
ployer to rely on the service provider's sales representative for such 
expertise? By now it should be apparent why such reliance may 
well be imprudent during either the initial selection or a periodic 
review of the plan's investment options. The service provider's fi-
nancial interests in obtaining and retaining the employer's 401 (k) 
plan business are in direct financial conflict with its interest in pro-
viding a candid analysis of the performance of the service 
provider's investment options. Employers cannot prudently rely on 
a service provider's opinion of its mutual funds performance or 
the competitiveness of its fees and expenses. ERISA's duty of pru-
dence should require the employer either to use its own in-house 
expertise to make this evaluation or to seek the assistance of an 
unbiased outside expert. 
d. Policy Choices: The Employee Ownership Dilemma-The second 
hypothetical introduces another set of policy choices that federal 
courts are likely to confront in 401 (k) plan fiduciary litigation. 
These policy issues arise when the employer includes company 
stock as an investment option in its 401 (k) plan. Here, the underly-
ing potential conflicts of interest stem not from the plan's service 
provider, but from the employer itself. 
SECOND HYPOTHETICAL 
Employer decides that, in addition to selecting seven mutual funds as 
investment options for its 401(k) plan, it will also include as an in-
vestment option its own publicly traded stock. The question presented 
to the federal court is whether Employer has satisfied its fiduciary duty 
of prudence by selecting company stock as an investment option. 
The "employee ownership dilemma" is introduced by the sec-
ond hypothetical. In this instance, the dilemma is not whether to 
encourage employee ownership as a matter of national economic 
policy; rather, it is whether, as a matter of national retirement policy, 
we want to use tax-favored 401 (k) plans as a vehicle to promote 
employee ownership. 
The traditional retirement plan vehicle used for promoting em-
ployee ownership is the employee stock ownership plan (ESOP).116 
116. EMPLOYEE BENEFITS RESEARCH INST., supra note 3, at 103-10; see also I.R.C. § 409 
(1994); Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-11 (as amended in 1979). 
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ERISA expressly exempts ESOPs from both the duty of prudence 
as it relates to plan investments in qualifYing employer securities1l7 
and the duty of prudent diversification of plan assets. liB These ex-
emptions are necessary because the assets of the ESOP must be 
invested primarily in employer securities for it to qualify for favor-
able tax treatment under the Internal Revenue Code. The policy 
justifications for ESOPs, however, are not applicable to 401 (k) 
I 119 pans. 
ESOPs can hold stock of a company that is not traded on a 
national securities exchange. 12o Thus, ESOPs offer employees of 
privately held companies, who otherwise would not be able to 
purchase company stock, a unique opportunity to share in the 
ownership of their employer. By contrast, the requirements of the 
404(c) Regulations mandate that 401 (k) plans hold only company 
stock that is publicly traded on a national market. 121 Thus, a 401 (k) 
plan with company stock as an investment option cannot be 
justified on the ground that it offers employees the sole 
opportunity to share in the ownership of their employer because 
the stock can be purchased outside the company 401 (k) plan. 
Rather, the employee ownership dilemma presented by 401 (k) 
plans is whether, as a matter of national retirement policy, the 
purchase of publicly traded company stock by employees should 
be encouraged through the use of pre-tax dollars contributed to a 
401 (k) plan. 
ERISA's statutory language provides mixed signals as to how the 
federal courts should approach the employer's selection of com-
pany stock as an investment option for 401 (k) plans. ERISA section 
404(a) (2) provides: 
In the case of an eligible individual account plan,122 the ... 
prudence requirement (only to the extent it requzres 
ll7. 29 U.S.C. § ll04(a) (2) (1994). 
ll8. [d. § 1107(d)(3)-(d) (4). 
ll9. See LR.C. § 409(a)(2); Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-11 (b). 
120. Compare LR.C. § 409(a}(2), with 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l (d)(2)(ii) (E)(4)(iii) 
(2000). 
121. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l (d)(2)(ii)(E)( 4) (iii). 
122. An "eligible individual account plan" is defined in ERISA section 407(d)(3) to 
include profit sharing, stock bonus, thrift, savings, employee stock ownership, and certain 
money purchase plans. 29 U.S.C. § ll07(d) (3) (1994). This definition includes a 401(k) 
plan. See id. The prohibited transaction rules of ERISA section 407, however, may restrict 
the value of employer qualifying securities attributable to elective deferrals to not more 
than ten percent of the value of all plan assets attributable to elective deferrals if certain 
criteria are met. [d. § 1l07(a)(2). These criteria are threefold: (1) a portion of the plan's 
elective deferrals or earnings thereon are required to be invested in qualifying employer 
securities under the terms or the plan or at the direction of someone other than the 
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diversification) ... is not violated by acquisition or holding of 
lifyi' I .. 123 124 ... qua ng emp oyer secuntIes .... 
Section 404(a) (2) can be read as creating a "strong policy and 
preference in favor of investment in employer stock.,,125 Yet the 
language of the statute clearly eliminates only one factor-
diversification-from consideration in evaluating the employer's 
compliance with the duty of prudence. 126 Other factors relevant to 
whether the employer has satisfied its duty of prudence remain. 127 
Perhaps the name of the legislation itself is instructive: the Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act. 128 There is compelling 
evidence that encouraging company stock as an investment option 
in 401 (k) plans is unlikely to promote income security during re-
tirement. 129 While a few lucky employees will be big winners, many 
others will be big losers. 13o 
The potential investment risk presented by company stock ar-
gues for a relatively high standard of prudence for employers who 
choose to include their own stock as a 401 (k) plan investment op-
tion. 131 From the perspective of protecting plan participants, the 
policy argument in favor of close scrutiny is reinforced by the ab-
sence of federal insurance in the event of employer insolvency.132 If 
the employer fails, so does the participant's 401 (k) plan invest-
ment in company stock. 
participant; (2) the portion of elective deferrals required to be invested in qualifying 
employer securities exceeds one percent of the employee's compensation used to 
determine the employee's maximum allowable elective deferrals under the plan for the 
year; and (3) the fair market value of all individual account plans (defined in ERISA Section 
407(d) (3» maintained by the employer exceeds ten percent of the fair market value of the 
assets of all pension plans (excluding multi-employer plans) maintained by the employer. 
29 U.S.C. §§ l107(a)(1)-(2),(b). 
123. "Qualifying employer securities" generally include company stock publicly traded 
on a national exchange or other generally recognized market. 29 U.S.C. § 1l07(d) (5). 
124. 29 U.S.C. § 1l04(a)(2) (1994) (emphasis added) (statutory cross-references omit-
ted). 
125. Fink v. Nat'l Sav. & Trust Co., 772 F.2d 951, 956 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (quoting Burud 
v. Acme Elec., 591 F. Supp. 238, 248 (D. Alaska 1984». 
126. Eaves v. Penn, 587 F.2d 453, 459-60 (10th Cir. 1978). 
127. See infra Part II.B.l.e. 
128. See Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 1,88 Stat. 829, 829 (1974). 
129. See supra note 52. 
130. [d. 
131. See Fink v. Nat'l Sav. & Trust Co., 772 F.2d 951, 955-56 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("The in-
vestment decisions of a profit sharing plan's fiduciary are subject to the closest scrutiny 
under the prudent person rule, in spite of the 'strong policy and preference in favor of 
investment in employer stock.' .. (internal citations omitted»; Eaves, 587 F.2d at 459-60. 
132. The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation provides insurance for retirement 
plan benefits only for defined benefit plans, not 401 (k) plans. A.B.A. EMPLOYEE BENEFITS 
COMM., supra note 12, at 362-63. This government insurance program is contained in Title 
IV of ERISA. [d. at 364. 
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e. Policy Analysis: Employer's Duty of Prudence in Selecting Company 
Stock as an Investment option-The same list of questions presented 
after the first hypothetical generally are applicable to the second 
hypothetical. I33 Seeking outside expertise becomes easier to resolve. 
Obviously, the employer is qualified to evaluate the substantive 
merits of including its own stock as an investment option. Because 
the company stock must be publicly traded,134 the need to make 
policy distinctions based upon employer size is reduced. 
Rate of return, volatility, and liquidity concerns become more 
prominent in the context of company stock. Employers who have 
recently "gone public" have no basis on which to evaluate these 
factors. Liquidity in particular becomes a concern in the event that 
a company is "delisted" from a national exchange or other market 
system for failure to meet market capitalization standards. ls5 
Diversification technically cannot be considered when the em-
ployer selects its own stock as an investment option. IS6 It is difficult, 
however, to ignore the growing number of studies of participant 
investment choices in 401 (k) plans, which indicate that when 
company stock is offered as an investment option participants tend 
to invest most heavily in company stock, over other more broad-
based investments in the equity markets. ls7 
Finally, given the absence of government insurance in the event 
of employer insolvency,IS8 a periodic review of continued suitability be-
comes more important for the protection of plan participants. 
Unfortunately, such protection also becomes more difficult. As a 
practical matter, the employer's stock is likely to become 
"unsuitable" only if the company is in financial distress. Until this 
material information becomes public, however, the employer's 
conduct concerning company stock held in the 401 (k) plan (and 
disclosure of information to its own employees) is constrained by 
federal securities laws. ls9 Once the company's financial distress be-
comes public information, as a practical matter, it will be too late 
133. See supra pp. 486-87, 489-91, 495. 
134. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l (d) (2) (ii) (E) (4) (iii) (2000). 
135. See NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANY 
MANUAL § 8 (2000), available at http://www.nyse.com (last visited May 7, 2001); NASDAQ 
LISTING REQUIREMENTS AND FEES (2001), available at http://www.nasdaq.com (last visited 
May 7, 2001). 
136. See 29 U.S.C. § 1l04(a)(2) (1994). 
137. See supra note 5l. 
138. See supra note 132. 
139. E.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (1994); Employment of 
Manipulative and Deceptive Devices, 17 C.F.R. § 240.l0b-5 (2000). See generally RALPH C. 
FERRARA ET AL., FERRARA ON INSIDER TRADING AND THE WALL (1999) (treatise on insider 
trading law). 
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for many employees to minimize their investment losses from their 
company stock holdings in the 401 (k) plan. Assuming an efficient 
equities market, the value of the stock will almost instantaneously 
have plummeted, and along with it, the value of the participant's 
retirement benefit. 141l 
2. The Employer's Duty oj Loyalty in Selecting 401(k) Plan Investment 
options 
a. Established Legal Standards-ERISA section 404(a)(1)(A) re-
quires an employer to "discharge his duties with respect to a plan 
solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and for 
the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to participants and 
their beneficiaries and defraying reasonable expenses of adminis-
tering the plan.,,141 Lawmakers intended the federal courts to 
interpret this standard, like the duty of prudence, in light of the 
I · f' I 142 po ICY purposes 0 retIrement pans. 
The federal courts generally have viewed this standard as incor-
porating the common law duty of undivided loyalty expected of 
trustees under the common law of trusts. 143 As one leading treatise 
states, "[d]ealingwith the plan assets in order to further one's own 
interests rather than those of the plan clearly violates the ... 
rule."I44 Like the duty of prudence, however, the duty of loyalty in-
vokes some degree of flexibility, and thus, judicial discretion, in 
application. Although an employer must discharge its fiduciary 
duties "with an eye single to the interests of the participants and 
beneficiaries,,,145 some federal courts have ruled that an employer's 
actions may also provide benefit "incidentally" to itself. 146 This in-
cidental benefit to an employer is not necessarily a breach of the 
duty of loyalty if the employer has conducted a prudent inquiry 
and has determined reasonably that its decision is in the best in-
140. The Securities and Exchange Commission's recent fair disclosure regulation, ef-
fective October 23, 2000, is designed to eliminate the practice of selective disclosure and, 
thereby, level the playing field between individual and institutional investors. Regulation FD 
(fair disclosure) is likely to reduce the informational advantage that securities analysts and 
institutional investors who trade in large blocks of a company's stock previously have en-
joyed over individual 401 (k) plan investors. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 
Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,716 (Aug. 24, 2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, 249), 
available at http://www.sec.gov (last visited May 7, 2001). 
141. 29 U.S.C. § 1l04(a)(l) (A). 
142. See supra note 58. 
143. E.g., Leigh v. Engle, 727 F.2d 113, 122-23 (7th Cir. 1984); Eaves v. Penn, 587 F.2d 
453,457 (lOth Cir. 1978); Freund v. Marshall & I1sley Bank, 485 F. Supp. 629, 639 (W.D. 
Wis. 1979). 
144. AB.A. EMPLOYEE BENEFITS COMM., supra note 12, at 273. 
145. Donovan v. BielWirth, 680 F.2d 263,271 (2d Cir. 1982). 
146. Trenton v. Scott Paper Co., 832 F.2d 806, 809 (3d Cir. 1987); Donovan v. Walton, 
609 F. Supp. 1221, 1244-46 (S.D. Fla. 1985). 
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terests of plan participants. 147 Thus, even though the employer's 
duty of prudence technically is separate from the employer's duty 
of loyalty, an employer's lack of prudence may also be a factor in 
determining whether a breach of the duty of loyalty occurred. 
b. Policy Choices: The Incidental Benefit Question-In the 401 (k) 
plan setting, multiple scenarios raise potential duty of loyalty is-
sues. Again, these scenarios arise when the employer selects the 
investment options for the 401 (k) plan. Under each, the policy 
dilemma for the federal courts will be to draw a line separating 
permitted "incidental" employer benefits from prohibited self-
dealing. This third set of policy choices is the "incidental benefit 
question." 
The duty of loyalty scenarios discussed below distinguish be-
tween general and specialized situations. Thus, the first generation 
of 401 (k) plan litigation currently before the federal courts in-
volves very large employers, with equally large public allegations of 
employer self-dealing using 401 (k) plan assets. 148 Although these 
cases garnered attention in the financial press, they involve a rela-
tively narrow population of employers and a specialized set of facts. 
Less noticed, but potentially much more significant from the 
perspective of national retirement policy, is the subtle abuse of 
401 (k) plan assets that every employer, large or small, can en-
gage in when selecting investment options for its 401 (k) plan. 
This abuse occurs when the employer attempts to reduce its cost 
of 401 (k) plan sponsorship by allowing the service provider to 
charge higher fees and expenses to the participants in the 401 (k) 
plan as a quid pro quo for lower administrative fees charged to the 
I 149 emp oyer. 
If left unchallenged, this subtle abuse is likely to have a major 
impact on the retirement income security of millions of 401 (k) 
plan participants. The Department of Labor actively campaigns 
against this practice by sensitizing both employers and employees 
to the issue. 15o In the discussion of duty of loyalty scenarios below, 
this subtle abuse scenario is presented first because of its 
147. Metzler v. Graham, 112 F.3d 207, 213 (5th Cir. 1997); Schaefer v. Ark. Med. Soc'y, 
853 F.2d 1487, 1492 (8th Cir. 1988); Leigh, 727 F.2d at 125-26; Bierwirth, 680 F.2d at 271; 
Newton v. Van Otterloo, 756 F. Supp. 1121, 1128-29 (N.D. Ind. 1991); Sandoval v. Sim-
mons, 622 F. Supp. 1174, 1212-13 (C.D. Ill. 1985); Walton, 609 F. Supp. at 1245. But see 
Schwartz v. Interfaith Med. Ctr., 715 F. Supp. 1190, 1196 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (finding that con-
flicts of interest made it impossible for corporate officers who also served as plan fiduciaries 
to satisfy ERISA's duty of loyalty). 
148. See supra notes 7-8. 
149. See infra Part II.B.2.c. 
150. See supra note 45. 
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widespread and significant implications for national retirement 
policy. More specialized litigation scenarios follow. 
c. Policy Analysis: The Fees for Costs Loyalty Scenario-The third 
hypothetical introduces the incidental benefit question that poten-
tially arises when any employer selects investment options for its 
401 (k) plan. 
THIRD HYPOTHETICAL 
Employer decides to establish a participant directed 401(k) plan. Em-
ployer approaches two Full Service Providers of 401(k) plans. Each 
Full Service Provider offers a convenient 401 (k) plan ''package'' con-
sisting of all necessary plan documents, administrative services, and 
plan investment options. 
There are two possibilities: 
First, Full Service Provider, a Bank, offers its own proprietary mutual 
funds as 401(k) plan investment options. The Bank's mutual funds 
charge a "load" fee (sales commission) of 2. 0 % to the plan partici-
pants. In addition, the Bank's mutual funds have an annual 
management fee (paid to the Bank's sister corporation) equivalent to 
2.0% of fund assets. If the Employer's 401(k) plan uses only the 
Bank's mutual funds as its investment options, the Bank will charge 
the Employer an annual Jee of $500 Jor plan administrative services. 
Second, Full Service Provider, a Brokerage Company, offers a wide 
variety of mutual Junds offered by a number of national mutual Jund 
companies as potential investment options Jor the Employer's 401(k) 
plan. These Junds vary in the load and management Jees they charge. 
Many oj these options carry no load Jee and deduct an annual man-
agement fee equivalent to 1.0% of Jund assets. The Brokerage 
Company allied itself with an outside vendor who provides plan ad-
ministrative services Jor 401 (k) plan customers oj the Brokerage 
Company. The Brokerage Company will charge the Employer an an-
nual fee of $2,500 Jor plan administrative services. 
The Employer selects the 401(k) plan package offered by the Bank. 
The question presented to the federal court is whether Employer has 
satisfied its fiduciary duty oj loyalty in selecting the Bank's proprie-
tary mutual Junds as the investment options Jor the 401 (k) plan. 
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The policy issue implicit in the third hypothetical is the inciden-
tal benefit question. Has the employer received a permissible 
incidental benefit of lower plan costs by selecting the higher-fee 
service provider, or has the employer breached its duty of loyalty 
by failing to act solely in the interests of the plan's participants? 
The answer to this question will have a significant impact on the 
retirement benefits received by the 401 (k) plan participants. 
Fees and expenses charged to 401 (k) plan participants over time 
can erode dramatically the value of their retirement benefits. The 
Department of Labor furnishes the following example of the cor-
rosive effect of plan fees and expenses: 
Assume that you are an employee with 35 years until retire-
ment and a current 401 (k) account balance of $25,000. If 
returns on investments in your account over the next 35 years 
average 7 percent and fees and expenses reduce your average 
returns by 0.5 percent, your account balance will grow to 
$227,000 at retirement, even if there are no further contribu-
tions to your account. If fees and expenses are 1.5 percent, 
however, your account balance will grow to only $163,000. 
The 1 percent difference in fees and expenses would reduce 
your account balance at retirement by 28 percent.151 
The Department of Labor made abusive fee practices by 401 (k) 
plan service providers a national investigative priority for 2000. 152 
This enforcement priority, however, was aimed at the egregious 
fee practices of plan service providers, not of employers. 153 
The Department of Labor's 1998 study of 401 (k) plan fees and 
expenses found that service providers routinely offer below cost 
plan administrative services to employers in exchange for higher 
asset management fees l54 that are usually charged to the plan's par-
ticipants. 155 The growing trend toward shifting the costs of plan 
sponsorship to participants means that the incidental benefit ques-
tion will likely grow in importance in the future. 156 
151. PENSION & WELFARE BENEFITS ADMIN., supra note 45, § 1. 
152. Pension and Welfare Benefits Admin.; Strategic Enforcement Plan, 65 Fed. Reg. 
18,208, 18,210 (Apr. 6, 2000); DOL Strategic Enforcement Plan, TRUST LETTER, May 1, 2000, at 
6. 
153. See supra note 152. 
154. PENSION & WELFARE BENEFITS ADMIN., supra note 37, § 3.3.1-.2. 
155. [d. §§ I, 3.6, 5.3.2. 
156. See id. § 3.7 ("ERISA charges ... plan sponsors with a fiduciary responsibility to act 
in the best interests of the plan participants. This implies that plan sponsors will know the 
costs of the services they procure and will apply due diligence to minimize these costs in the 
light of the level of services desired."). 
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The incidental benefit question in the plan fees and expenses 
context intersects the more profound policy dilemma of employer 
burden versus participant protection. Here again, the federal 
courts should be aware of the distinctions between large and small 
employers. Large employers controlling 401 (k) plans with sizable 
assets have market bargaining power-.157 Service providers compete 
fiercely for their business and are willing to discount fees and ex-
penses accordingly.15B Small employers with 401 (k) plans of 
comparably small asset size lack such bargaining leverage. 159 They 
tend to be limited in their investment options to so-called "retail 
mutual funds," which have the highest investment management 
c lfiO J.ees. 
The technical evidentiary burden presented by the incidental 
benefit question is how to ascertain the motives of an employer 
who selects a higher fee service provider. Absent the proverbial 
smoking gun, evidence of an employer's motives will necessarily be 
circumstantial and will most likely overlap with evidence of the 
employer's procedural and substantive pmdence. 161 
The employer's procedural prudence involves questions regard-
ing its decisionmaking process, and perhaps most importantly, 
documentation of that process. 162 How many service providers did 
the employer consider, and did the employer attempt a compara-
tive analysis of their fees and expenses? In the past, requiring this 
type of comparative analysis arguably could have imposed an un-
due burden on employers. 163 Today, the potential for a chilling 
effect on plan sponsorship is much less likely because the Depart-
ment of Labor has issued a series of questions l64 and a standardized 
form for employers to use in comparing the fees and expenses of 
potential plan service providers,165 developed with various repre-
sentatives of the service provider industry. 166 Consequently, a 
service provider's refusal to cooperate in supplying this informa-
tion in itself should be a red flag to the employer. 
157. [d. §§ 3.5.1, IV; Schultz & Brown, supra note 8. 
158. PENSION & WELFARE BENEFITS ADMIN., supra note 37, §§ 2.4.1.3, IV. 
159. [d. §§ 3.7 ("smaller plans do not benefit from this price competition"), IV. 
160. [d. § 2.4.1.1-.3. 
16l. See supra Part II.B.l.a. 
162. See supra notes 60-68 and accompanying text. 
163. See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text. 
164. PENSION & WELFARE BENEFITS ADMIN., supra note 45, § 6. 
165. PENSION & WELFARE BENEFITS ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, ABC PLAN 401 (K) 
PLAN FEE DISCLOSURE FORM, at http://www.dol.gov/dol/pwba (last visited May 7, 2001) 
(on file with author). 
166. Press Release, Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration, Labor Secretary 
Herman Announces New Disclosure Information on 401 (k) Fees (July IS, 1999), availabk at 
http://www.dol.gov/dol/pwba (last visited May 7, 2001). 
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Paperwork alone, however, cannot be relied upon as conclusive 
proof of the employer's loyal motives in selecting the investment 
options for its 401 (k) plan. There must be some objective way to 
evaluate the substantive prudence of the employer's decision, oth-
erwise the employer's duty of loyalty can be too easily 
circumvented by the subterfuge of savvy documentation. 
The employer'S substantive prudence can be evaluated by com-
paring the plan'S fees and expenses with the published industry 
averages for 401 (k) plans of similarly sized assets and participant 
numbers. 167 This industry measure of substantive prudence should 
be tempered, however, by a qualitative examination of the services 
being provided by the employer's selected provider. Cheaper is 
not always better. 
Ultimately, where do these competing policy considerations 
lead the federal courts who must deal with the incidental benefit 
question? Employers naturally would prefer a bright line test that 
promotes certainty in determining their fiduciary responsibilities. 
Such a bright line rule, however, is likely to prove rigid and 
inflexible. In the alternative, a flexible multi-factor test based on 
the facts and circumstances will create uncertainty for employers, 
but is likely to lead to better policy. 
The 401 (k) plan services industry is highly competitive. l68 A 
multi-factor test will focus this competition and, consequently, 
promote lower fees and expenses. In contrast, a bright line rule 
proclaiming that a specified amount or formula for fees and ex-
penses is "prudent" may codifY today's historically high levels of 
401 (k) plan fees and expenses. 169 Perhaps more importantly, ex-
perts in the employee benefits community are just beginning to 
examine what constitutes prudent practice for employers who 
sponsor 401 (k) plans. For example, some employee benefits ex-
perts suggest that employers develop and use an investment policy 
to guide their selection and monitoring of 401 (k) plan investment 
options. 170 Few employers currently have investment policies for 
their 401 (k) plans. l7l In ten years, however, such an investment 
policy may have evolved into a norm for employer prudence. A 
multi-factor test would encourage this evolution. When the law is 
uncertain, employers (and the ERISA experts who counsel them) 
167. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text. 
168. See PENSION & WELFARE BENEFITS ADMIN., supra note 45, § 1. 
169. See Bogle, supra note 109. 
170. Banham, supra note 8, at 75; Carolyn Hirschman, 40J(k)s Need Investment Policies, 
Too, HRMAGAZINE, Oct. 1, 1999, at 100. 
171. Hirschman, supra note 170. 
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naturally tend to err on the side of caution. Such caution is likely 
to inure to the greater protection of 401 (k) plan participants. 
d. Policy Analysis: The Shop Only at the Company Store Loyalty Sce-
nario-The "shop only at the company store" scenario is limited to 
employers who are themselves service providers to 401 (k) plans. 
The fourth hypothetical below illustrates a typical fact pattern. 
FOURTH HYPOTHETICAL 
Employer is a Full Service Provider with its own line of proprietary 
mutual funds. Employer acquires another company, which becomes a 
Subsidiary of Employer. Employer merges the pre-existing 401(k) plan 
of the Subsidiary into Employer's 401(k) plan. Employer substitutes 
its own proprietary mutual funds for the investment options previ-
ously offered under the Subsidiary's 401 (k) plan. The question 
presented to the federal court is whether the Employer has satisfied its 
fiduciary duty of loyalty in selecting its own line of proprietary mu-
tual funds as investment options for the 401 (k) plan. 
The practice by employers in the financial services industry of 
using their own mutual funds for the retirement plans of their 
employees predates ERISA. 172 Mter ERISA was enacted, it appeared 
that this practice violated ERISA's prohibited transaction rules.I73 
Responding to industry requests, in 1977, the Department of La-
bor issued an administrative exemption that allowed this practice 
to continue free of ERISA's prohibited transaction rules. I74 As a 
result, this practice continues to be widespread among employers 
in the financial services industry.175 
With respect to ERISA's fiduciary responsibility provisions, 
however, the Department of Labor's position is that the prohibited 
172. Proposed Prohibited Transaction Class Exemption 77-3, 41 Fed. Reg. 54,080, 
54,081 (Dec. 10, 1976). 
173. Id. 
174. Final Prohibited Transaction Exemption 77-3, 42 Fed. Reg. 18,734, 18,734 (Apr. 
8,1977); DONALD]' MEYERS & MICHAEL B. RICHMAN, ERISA CLASS EXEMPTIONS 79-91 (2d 
ed. 1996 & Supp. 2000). Adoption of Prohibited Transaction Class Exemption 77-3 placed 
in-house plans of mutual fund companies on the same footing as in-house plans of banks 
and insurance companies. Prohibited Transaction Class Exemption 77-3, 41 Fed. Reg. at 
54,080; MEYERS & RICHMAN, supra, at 79. In-house plans of banks and insurance companies 
are statutorily exempted from the prohibited transaction rules. 29 U.S.C. § 1l08(b) (4)(A)-
(5)(A) (1994). 
175. Jacobius, 401(k) Precedent?, sUfrra note 9; Arleen Jacobius, Seroice Praviders Aren't 
Concerned, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Sept. 20, 1999, at 61 [hereinafter Jacobius, Seroice 
Providers J. 
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transaction exemption does not exempt an employer from its 
fiduciary duties under ERISA section 404(a) .176 The first 
generation of 401 (k) plan fiduciary litigation has produced two 
types of factual allegations involving an employer's breach of the 
duty of loyalty. The first type of allegation involves a service 
provider who charges higher 401 (k) plan fees and expenses to its 
own employees than to its 401 (k) plan customers. 177 The second 
type of allegation involves a service provider who has, by industry 
standards, a relatively small amount of investment assets under 
management. 178 To make its investment vehicles more attractive to 
large institutional players in the retirement plan market, the 
service provider needs to increase the size of its investment assets 
under management. 179 By limiting employee 401 (k) investment 
options to the service provider's proprietary investment vehicles, 
the service provider can quickly increase the size of its investment 
products and, in the process, attract business from outside 
• 180 Investors. 
Both types of factual allegations squarely raise the incidental 
benefit question. Again, the difficult evidentiary issue is to ascer-
tain the employer's motives in selecting its own products as 
investment options for its employees' 401 (k) plan. Here, a useful 
objective standard to add to the multi-factor test suggested previ-
ouslyl81 is to compare the employer's practices with those of other 
service providers in the industry.182 The focus of this comparison 
should not be whether the employer has conformed to the indus-
try's lowest common denominator. This approach will only 
176. Office of Pensions & Welfare Benefits, Dep't of Labor, Op. Ltr. 98-06A Ouly 30, 
1998) (cautioning against using 401 (k) plan assets as "seed money" for an employer's mu· 
tual funds). 
177. See generally Demby, supra note 8 (discussing allegations that First Union Corpora-
tion violated its fiduciary duty in handling pension plan assets associated with its acquisition 
of Signet Bank); England, supra note 8 (same). The bulk of these fees are attributable to 
investment management fees generated when the service provider's employees invest their 
401 (k) plan money in the employer's proprietary investment vehicles, which in tum gener-
ate income for the service provider. Demby, supra note 8. 
178. See generally Demby, supra note 8 (discussing allegations that First Union Corpora-
tion violated its fiduciary duty in handling pension plan assets associated with its acquisition 
of Signet Bank); England, supra note 8 (same). 
179. See Demby, supra note 8, at 74. 
180. See id. 
181. See supra Part II.B.2.c. 
182. The practices of other leading service providers in the industry indicate that a 
higher standard of loyalty to the employer's own employees certainly is possible. For exam-
ple, Vanguard offers only its own mutual funds as investment options for its own employees' 
401 (k) plan, but offers these funds "at cost." Jacobius, Service Providers, supra note 175. Mer-
rill Lynch offers sixty-four investment options to its employees, of which six are outside 
(non-proprietary) funds. [d. 
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fossilize low industry standards. Rather, the federal courts should 
focus on those service providers whose practices in administering 
401 (k) plans for their own employees are the most favorable, in 
terms of fees, expenses, and investment option flexibility, to their 
employees. Such an approach is likely to provide greater insight 
into the employer's motives. It forces the employer to articulate 
and justify why it cannot adopt the same favorable practices as its 
competitors in the industry. In the long run, this inquiry will pro-
mote the evolution of more effective fiduciary standards for those 
401 (k) plan participants who must shop only at the company store. 
e. Policy Analysis: Company Stock Loyalty Scenarios in Mergers and 
Acquisitions---Company stock scenarios involve publicly traded 
companies who include their own stock as an investment option in 
their 401 (k) plans. There are numerous scenarios in which com-
pany stock held in a 401 (k) plan could generate claims that the 
employer has breached its duty of loyalty. Company stock held in a 
401 (k) plan sets the stage for potential conflicts of interest be-
tween the employer's corporate fiduciary duty to its shareholders 
and its ERISA fiduciary duty to 401 (k) plan participants. Inclusion 
of company stock as an investment option creates the potential for 
undue influence by the employer when participants' votes are 
weighted according to their ownership of company stock. These 
voting matters may include corporate governance, such as the elec-
tion of directors, or the approval of tender offers or mergers. 
Finally, the inclusion of company stock in the employer's 401 (k) 
plan can raise incidental benefit questions. The fifth hypothetical 
below presents an example in which these considerations become 
intertwined. 183 
FIFTH HYPOTHETICAL 
Employer A sponsors a 401(k) plan that includes Employer A s com-
pany stock as an investment option. Employer A spins off one of its 
subsidiary companies into a new public company, Company C. As a 
result, participants in the Employer A 401(k) plan who originally 
held Employer A company stock now also hold stock of Company C. 
183. Although on the surface this hypothetical may appear to be unrealistic, it is not. 
The fifth hypothetical is loosely based on the plaintiffs' allegations in Gottlieb v. SBC Commu-
nications, Inc., No. CV-00-04139, AHM(MANx) (C.D. Cal. filed April 18, 2000, amended 
Nov. 6, 2000), available at http://www.airtouchsuit.com (last visited Mar. 31, 2001). 
SPRING 2001] Stock Market Volatility 509 
Later, Employer A merges into Employer B. The Employer A's 401 (k) 
plan is merged into Employer B's 401(k) plan. Employer B's 401(k) 
plan has Employer B company stock as an investment option. Com-
pany C is a direct competitor of Employer B. Employer B liquidates the 
Company C stock holdings of the former Employer A 401 (k) plan par-
ticipants, and invests the proceeds in company stock of their new 
Employer B. 
Employer B justifies the liquidation of the Company C stock on the 
ground that its 401(k) plan should not encourage its employees to 
promote the success of a business competitor. Shareholders (and ana-
lysts) of Employer B are delighted when the share price of the Employer 
B company stock receives a boost as a result of the large purchase by 
the Employer B 401(k) plan. High-level corporate officers whose com-
pensation is based in part on the stock price of Employer B also 
benefit. Two years later, the share price of the Employer B company 
stock has failed to increase further in value. Meanwhile, the shares of 
Company C stock have tripled in value. 
The question presented to the federal court is whether Employer B has 
breached its duty of loyalty to those participants whose Company C stock 
was liquidated and replaced with the company stock of Employer B.IS4 
Resolving duty of loyalty cases that involved company stock nec-
essarily will turn on the unique facts of each case. The purpose 
here is not to provide a global solution to these types of cases, but 
rather, to identifY the three approaches the federal courts may 
adopt to resolve these cases and discuss their underlying policy 
implications. 
The first (and most drastic) approach is for the federal courts to 
rule that employer decisions concerning company stock, even 
company stock held in a 401 (k) plan, are a protected settlor func-
tion under ERISA. ls5 The settlor function doctrine is a judicially 
184. The duty of loyalty question in the fifth hypothetical is triggered by a corporate 
merger. Despite the fact that mergers and acquisitions are common, the ERISA fiduciary 
duties of corporate employers in these situations are unclear. England, supra note 8, at 70. 
ERISA section 208 requires only that after a plan merger, "each participant in the plan 
would (if the plan then terminated) receive a benefit immediately after the merger, con-
solidation, or transfer [of plan assets] which is equal to or greater than the benefit he would 
have been entitled to receive immediately before the merger, consolidation, or transfer (if 
the plan had then terminated)." 29 U.S.C. § 1058 (1994). This provision also is part of the 
statutory requirements for qualified plans. I.R.C. § 414(1) (1994); see also A.BA EMPLOYEE 
BENEFITS COMM., supra note 12, at 175-78 (describing how the merger rule works in prac-
tice) . 
185. In most corporate mergers or acquisitions, the separate 401 (k) plans of the com-
bining corporate entities also must be merged to satisfY the minimum coverage 
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created exception to the employer's fiduciary responsibilities un-
der ERISA. 186 The doctrine attempts to draw a sharp line between 
actions taken in an employer's corporate capacity and actions 
taken in its fiduciary capacity. In a nutshell, the doctrine says that 
employer "business" decisions, including decisions involving the 
establishment, amendment, merger, or termination of employee 
benefit plans are made in the employer's capacity as "settlor" of 
the plan and, therefore, are not subject to ERISA's fiduciary duty 
. . 187 proVIslOns. 
In recent years, the Supreme Court has issued several decisions 
construing the scope of the settlor function doctrine. 188 The doc-
trine has yet to be applied, however, to employer decisions 
concerning company stock held in a 401 (k) plan, nor should it be 
in the future. The settlor function approach is flawed. Although 
the settlor function doctrine attempts to distinguish business deci-
sions made by the employer, as the fifth hypothetical illustrates, 
such decisions in the 401 (k) plan context quickly cross over into 
core ERISA fiduciary functions as defined by the statute. 
ERISA defines a fiduciary as anyone who "exercises any discre-
tionary authority or discretionary control respecting management 
of such plan or exercises any authority or control respecting man-
agement or disposition of its assets.,,189 This statutory definition 
must be considered in light of the Department of Labor's interpre-
tation that the selection of 401 (k) plan investment options is a 
fiduciary function. 19o Referring back to the facts of the fifth hypo-
thetical, the federal courts could attempt to split some fine legal 
hairs by drawing a distinction between the removal of the Com-
pany C stock as an investment option and the selection of the 
Employer B company stock as a replacement. Under this hair-
splitting approach, a federal court will view the removal of the 
Company C stock as falling within the scope of the settlor function, 
characterizing it as part of the termination and merger of the Em-
ployer A 401 (k) plan. Employer B's selection of its own company 
requirements for qualified retirement plans. I.R.C. § 410(b) (1994). When this plan merger 
occurs, ERISA's "anti-cutback" provision, which is also a tax code requirement for qualified 
plans, I.R.C. § 411 (d)(6) (1994), does not require the surviving employer to preserve the 
pre-existing investments, including company stock, of participants in the acquired 401 (k) 
plan, 29 U.S.C. § 1054(g) (1994). See also 26 C.F.R. § 1.411 (d)-4(d)(7) (2000). 
186. Jane K. Stanley, The Definition of a Fiduciary Under ERISA: Basic Principles, 27 REAL 
PROP. PROB. & TR.J. 237, 244-45 (1992). 
187. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 443 (1999); Lockheed Corp. v. 
Spink, 517 U.S. 882,890 (1996). 
188. See supra note 187. 
189. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (1994). 
190. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
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stock will, however, under the Department of Labor's interpreta-
tion, still be reviewed by the federal courts as a fiduciary act of 
Employer B. If a federal court severs these two decisions concern-
ing the 401 (k) plan assets and analyzes them independently, 
Employer B can more easily justify its decision to include its own 
company stock as an investment option in the 401 (k) plan. 
From a policy perspective, the settlor function approach to 
company stock scenarios clearly negates the employer's duty of 
loyalty in the circumstances in which it is most needed. In the fifth 
hypothetical, Employer B's decision to limit the investment op-
tions in the 401 (k) plan to Employer B's company stock appears 
benign when viewed in isolation. Viewed in the context of the en-
tire transaction, however, Employer B's decision appears to be 
tainted by numerous conflicts of interest. A federal court ruling 
that Employer B's conduct is protected from judicial scrutiny as a 
settlor function will be an open invitation to employer self-dealing 
and abuse of 401 (k) plan assets invested in company stock. 
A second approach is for the federal courts to rely on evidence 
of procedural prudence in determining whether an employer has 
satisfied its fiduciary duty of loyalty. An expansive interpretation of 
what constitutes a permitted incidental benefit to the corporate 
employer may be coupled with this approach. This is the 
"formalistic approach." 
The formalistic approach has several practical policy implica-
tions. A strong and early signal to the employee benefits 
community that the federal courts will rely heavily on procedural 
prudence will lead to immediate conforming behavior by employ-
ers. Policies directing the treatment of 401 (k) plans holding 
company stock in mergers or acquisition situations will spring 
forth overnight from experts in the employee benefits community. 
These same experts will counsel employers to eliminate the ap-
pearance of conflicts of interest by eliminating any overlap 
between those persons who serve on the corporation's board of 
directors and the individuals who form the 401 (k) plan's adminis-
trative committee. Meticulous documentation of fiduciary 
decisions affecting 401 (k) plans in merger and acquisition situa-
tions will occur. Perhaps most practical of all, if the federal courts 
adopt a formalistic approach to these cases, summary judgments 
based on procedures and related employer documentation will be 
made more feasible and more likely to be upheld upon appeal. 
Skeptics will argue that excessive reliance on the formalistic ap-
proach is inconsistent with ERISA's policy of protecting plan 
participants. After all, clever ERISA experts can advise employers 
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how to meet the facial standards for procedural prudence, and 
document virtually any employer decision. These skeptics are 
right. Sole reliance on a formalistic approach will effectively 
amend the employer'S statutory duty of loyalty. It will dramatically 
lower the traditionally high standard of judicial scrutiny for fiduci-
ary conflicts of interestsl91 to a de facto "arbitrary and capricious" 
level of judicial review. 192 
The proper approach for the federal courts to use in cases in-
volving company stock is to engage in a probing analysis of the 
employer's decisions consistent with judicial precedent interpret-
ing the employer's duty of loyalty.193 The employer'S apparent 
procedural prudence will then be only one factor in determining 
whether the duty of loyalty has been satisfied. 194 This is the 
"fiduciary scrutiny" approach. 
The fiduciary scrutiny approach has several beneficial policy ef-
fects. 195 First, experts in the employee benefits community will be 
more likely to counsel employers to avoid future potential prob-
lems by not including company stock as an investment option in 
newly established 401 (k) plans. Such cautious advice will deter the 
practice and thereby reduce the accompanying risk of large in-
vestment losses by 401 (k) plan participants. Second, employers 
who already have 401 (k) plans with company stock as an invest-
ment option will be likely to err on the side of non-interference 
with company stock in merger and acquisitions situations. If the 
acquiring employer decides that a change must be made that af-
fects the acquired employer's company stock held in a 401 (k) 
plan, the acquiring employer will be more likely to make greater 
options available to those 401 (k) plan participants. In addition, a 
more complete and thorough disclosure of these options by the 
acquiring employer is likely to occur.196 Such improved disclosures 
191. See supra note 95. 
192. Cf In re Unisys Sav. Plan Litig., 173 F.3d 145, 154-55 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that 
the district court erred in applying deferential arbitrary and capricious standard to em-
ployer's duty of prudence and that the appropriate judicial standard as required by the 
statute is "prudence under the circumstances"). 
193. See supra Part II.B.2.a. 
194. See supra note 147 and accompanying text. 
195. One potential policy concern that is unlikely to materialize from a fiduciary scru-
tiny approach is a deterrence effect on merger and acquisition activity. In making these 
strategic decisions, federal judges need not be concerned that 401 (k) plans will become the 
tail that wags the corporate dog. The effect of a merger or acquisition on employee benefit 
plans is usually never considered until long after the business details of the deal are final-
ized. England, supra note 8, at 72 ("Merger negotiations seldom attach a high priority to 
workers' nest eggs. Thus, details of pension programs often get short shrift."). 
196. Jacobius, supra note 8. 
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will enable the 401 (k) plan participants to make more informed 
decisions concerning their 401 (k) plan assets. 
The costs, in terms of judicial resources, of adopting the fiduci-
ary scrutiny approach will be high. Probing scrutiny is factually 
intensive and time-consuming for the federal district court judges 
who must act as the triers of fact. 197 The fiduciary scrutiny approach 
also is less conducive to summary judgment disposition.19B The ju-
dicial cost, however, also carries with it potential benefits for 
national retirement policy. The fiduciary scrutiny approach is 
likely to deter company stock loyalty scenarios in mergers and ac-
quisitions. Employers engaged in mergers and acquisitions will be 
reluctant to engage in conduct that may trigger prolonged and 
complex ERISA fiduciary litigation. Consequently, the mere threat 
of time-consuming and costly federal litigation will serve to protect 
participants from the employer misuse of company stock held in 
401 (k) plans. 
3. The Employer'S Duty of Prudent Diversification and the 404(c) 
Regulations Defense-It seems paradoxical to speak of the em-
ployer's duty of prudent diversification in the context of a 401 (k) 
plan in which the participants themselves direct the investment of 
their individual accounts. Nevertheless, the duty of prudent diver-
sification of plan assets remains relevant due to two subtle, yet 
significant, Department of Labor interpretations of ERISA section 
404(c). 
First, an initial affirmative investment direction made by the 
plan participant is required to activate the employer's liability ex-
emption under section 404(c).I99 Until this first affirmative 
investment direction is made, the employer remains responsible 
for the investment of assets held in the participant'S 401 (k) plan 
account. 2OO It is only after the participant has made an affirmative 
investment direction that, assuming all of the requirements of the 
404(c) Regulations have been met, the employer is not responsible 
for investment losses resulting from the participant's investment 
197. See supra note 12. For an example of the fact-finding task that is likely to face the 
federal courts under the fiduciary scrutiny approach, see the federal district court's opinion 
in In re Unisys Savings Plan Litigation, 21 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2514 (E.D. Pa. 
1997). 
198. See In re Unisys Say. Plan Litig., 74 F.3d 420, 425 (3d Cir. 1996) (vacating district 
court's grant of summary judgment and remanding the case for a bench trial). 
199. Final Rule Regarding Participant Directed Individual Account Plans, 57 Fed. Reg. 
46,906,46,923 (Oct. 13, 1992) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l). 
200. Id.; Medill, supra note 22, at 37 (criticizing this rule as misleading to plan partici-
pants in practice). 
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direction.201 This agency interpretation has important conse-
quences for the growing interest among employers in so-called 
"automatic enrollment" 401 (k) plans.202 
Second, the Department of Labor interprets the 404(c) Regula-
tions as a defense or statutory exemption to employer conduct that 
violates the duty of prudent diversification of assets.203 Mere non-
compliance with the 404(c) Regulations does not, in and of itself, 
establish a breach of the employer's duty of prudent diversification 
of assets.204 Therefore, in an action to recover investment losses 
from the employer, if the employer has not breached any other 
fiduciary duties, the plan participant must establish a breach by the 
employer of the duty of prudent diversification of assets. These 
types of "sore loser" cases and the employer's related defense un-
der 404(c) Regulations205 are discussed in Part II.3.b. below. 
a. The Employer's Duty of Prudent Diversification and the Automatic 
Enrollment Scenario-ERISA section 404(a)(l)(c) requires the em-
ployer to "diversify... the investments of the plan so as to 
minimize the risk of large losses, unless, under the circumstances, 
it is clearly prudent not to do so. ,,206 The legislative history explains 
this duty as follows: 
Ordinarily the fiduciary should not invest the whole or an 
unduly large proportion of the trust property in one type of 
security or in various types of securities dependent upon the 
success of one enterprise or upon conditions in one locality, 
since the effect is to increase the risk of large losses. Thus, al-
though the fiduciary may be authorized to invest in industrial 
stocks, he should not invest a disproportionate amount of the 
plan assets in the shares of corporations engaged in a particu-
I . d 207 ar III ustry. 
201. Final Rule Regarding Participant Directed Individual Account Plans, 57 Fed. Reg. at 
46,923. 
202. This trend and related policy issues are discussed infra in Parts II.B.3.a. and III.B.2. 
203. Final Rule Regarding Participant Directed Individual Account Plans, 57 Fed. Reg. 
at 46,906 & n.2. ERISA section 404(a)(2) exempts participant directed 401 (k) plans from 
the duty of prudent diversification with respect to investments in qualifying employer secu-
rities. 29 U.S.C. § 1l04(a)(2) (1994). 
204. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l (a)(2) (2000); Final Rule Regarding Participant Directed 
Individual Account Plans, 57 Fed. Reg. at 46,906-07 . 
. 205. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1. 
206. 29 U.S.C. § 1l04(a) (1)(C). 
207. H.R. CONF. REp. No. 93-1280, at 304 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.CAN. 5038, 
5085. 
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The federal courts have broad discretion in determining 
whether a breach of the duty of prudent diversification of plan as-
sets has occurred. There is no fixed formula or percentage that 
will determine when plan assets are concentrated unduly in a sin-
gle or similar investment.2oB Instead, the federal courts must 
consider all of the facts and circumstances.209 
Cases construing the employer's duty of prudent diversification 
of plan assets are set in the context of plans directed by trustees 
responsible for the investment of plan assets.210 In this setting, the 
federal courts view the entirety of the plan's investments to deter-
mine whether a breach of duty occurred. 211 In contrast, in the 
401 (k) plan context, the appropriate focus is on each participant's 
individual account. 
Beginning in 1998, the Internal Revenue Service issued a series 
of revenue rulings that encourage employers who sponsor 401 (k) 
plans to enroll all eligible workers in the plan, deduct a set per-
centage of employee compensation (typically one to three 
percent), and contribute that amount to employee 401 (k) plans.212 
This type of enrollment arrangement is known as an "automatic 
enrollment" 401 (k) plan. 
In a traditional 401 (k) plan, the employee must affirmatively 
enroll as a participant in the plan.213 Until the enrollment paper-
work is completed, the employee may not participate in the 401 (k) 
plan. A convenient way to conceptualize the traditional 401 (k) 
plan is that the plan presumes an employee will not participate, 
and the employee must affirmatively act to overcome that pre-
sumption. Of course, there will be a certain group of workers who 
will not take action, and, consequently, will not participate in the 
plan. 
Automatic enrollment arrangements attempt to capture this 
group by reversing the presumption of non participation. An 
208. In re Unisys Say. Plan Litig., 74 F.3d 420, 438 (3d Cir. 1996); H.R. CONF. REp. No. 
93-1280, at 304 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5084. 
209. Metzler v. Graham, 112 F.3d 207, 209 (5th Cir. 1999); Marshall v. Glass/Metal 
Ass'n, 507 F. Supp. 378, 383-84 (D. Haw. 1980); H.R. CONF. REp. No. 93-1280, at 304, 
(1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5084-85. 
210. Metzler, 112 F.3d at 208; Freund v. Marshall, 485 F. Supp. 629, 636 (W.O. Wis. 
1979); Glass/Metal Ass 'n, 507 F. Supp. at 378; Marshall v. Teamsters Local 282 Pension Fund, 
458 F. Supp. 986, 988-90 (E.D.N.Y. 1978). 
211. See, e.g., Sandoval v. Simmons, 622 F. Supp. 1174,1211 (C.D. Ill. 1985). 
212. Rev. Rul. 98-30, 1998-1 C.B. 1273; Rev. Rul. 2000-8, 2000-7 I.R.B. 617; IRS An-
nouncement 2000-60, 2000-31 I.R.B. 149; Bill Barnhart, Questions Abound About Forced 
Savings, CHI. TRIBUNE, Aug. 6, 2000, § 5, at 3. 
213. Barnhart, supra note 212; Clinton Urges Automatic Enrollment in Employers' Section 
401(k) Plans, DAILY TAX REp., June 5, 1998, at G-9 [hereinafter Clinton Urges Automatic En-
rollment). 
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automatic enrollment plan presumes that every eligible employee 
will participate. The employer enrolls every eligible employee and 
puts the burden on the employee to opt out of the plan.214 The re-
sult is a higher rate of employee participation in the 401 (k) plan.215 
From the perspective of national retirement policy, automatic 
enrollment plans are a positive development because they encour-
age increased retirement savings. Few employers offer such plans, 
however. A 1999 survey by Hewitt Associates found that, despite 
Internal Revenue Service approval, only seven percent of employ-
ers have adopted an automatic enrollment for their 401 (k) plans.216 
One of the major obstacles to the widespread adoption of auto-
matic enrollment plans is the legal ambiguity surrounding the 
employer's fiduciary responsibility and potential liability under 
ERISA.217 This ambiguity is illustrated by the sixth hypothetical. 
SIXTH HYPOTHETICAL 
Employer adopts an automatic enrollment 401 (k) plan. The plan 
provides that upon commencement of employment all eligible employ-
ees are enrolled as participants in the plan. Employer will deduct and 
contribute to the plan three percent of each employee's compensation. 
The employee can "opt out" of participating in the 401 (k) plan by 
completing the necessary paperwork. 
The 401(k) plan provides that unless and until the employee elects 
differently, the employee's contributions to the plan will be invested in 
a money market mutual fund that earns an investment return of five 
percent annually. All employees are notified of this "default" invest-
ment provision and are encouraged to exercise their right to invest in 
214. Barnhart supra note 212. 
215. I.R.S. Announcement 2000-60, 2000-31 I.R.B. 149; Clinton Urges Automatic EnroU-
ment, supra note 213; see also PROFIT SHARING/401 (K) COUNCIL OF AMERICA, AUTOMATIC 
ENROLLMENT 2000, at http://www.psca.org (last visited on May 8,2001) (study of how com-
panies structure their automatic enrollment plans) (on file with author). SUlVey results 
indicate that automatic enrollment plans have an employee participation rate of ninety 
percent or more, compared with a participation rate in traditional 401 (k) plans of around 
seventy percent. See Barnhart, supra note 212. 
216. Hewitt Associates, supra note 41. This was an increase from just four percent in 
1997. /d. 
217. See Barnhart, supra note 212. Another legal obstacle to the widespread adoption of 
automatic enrollment plans is the uncertainty as to whether this type of arrangement vio-
lates state laws governing employee payroll deductions and, if so, whether such state laws 
are nonetheless preempted by ERISA A discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this 
Article. 
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the diversified range of investment options available to participants 
in the 401 (k) plan. 
In 1998, Employee A is automatically enrolled in the 401 (k) plan 
upon commencement of her employment. Employee A never opts out of 
the 401 (k) plan and fails to exercise her right to select the investment 
options for her contributions automatically made to the plan. As a re-
sult, her contributions are invested in the plan's default option, the 
money market mutual fund. 
In 2005, Employee A is ready to retire. Her 401 (k) plan account has 
experienced investment earnings from the money market fund equal to 
fifty percent of her total contributions. Employee A is upset when she 
learns that if her 401 (k) contributions had been invested instead in 
one or a combination of the plan's equity-based mutual funds, her re-
tirement benefit from the 401 (k) plan would have been three hundred 
percent more due to the greater investment returns. 
Employee A sues Employer for breach of its fiduciary duty of prudent 
diversification. The question presented to the federal court is whether 
the Employer is liable under ERISA for the "lost" investment gains 
Employee A did not receive because her contributions were invested in 
the plan's default money market fund instead of an equity-based mu-
tual fund or funds. 
The sixth hypothetical raises three novel issues for resolution by 
the federal courts. These issues involve interpretation of the 
404(c) Regulations, the employer's fiduciary duty of prudent di-
versification of plan assets, and ERISA's remedy provisions. 
The first issue raised by the sixth hypothetical is whether Em-
ployee A made an affirmative investment direction sufficient to 
trigger the 404(c) Regulations. If so, Employer may assert as a de-
fense exemption from fiduciary liability under the 404(c) 
Regulations. The historical development of the 404( c) Regulations 
suggests how the federal courts should approach this issue. When 
the Department of Labor first proposed the 404(c) Regulations in 
1987, the agency initially extended the liability exemption of 
ERISA section 404(c) to employers in situations in which the par-
ticipant had not made an affirmative investment direction. 218 To 
qualifY for this protection, the employer had to satisfy several con-
ditions, but primarily the participant's account had to be invested 
218. Proposed Regulation Regarding Participant Directed Individual Account Plans, 52 
Fed. Reg. 33,508, 33,511-12 (Sept. 3, 1987). 
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in one of two possible "safe" default investment options.219 These 
two safe default options were an interest-bearing bank deposit ac-
count or a money market mutual fund. 220 Commentators on the 
1987 draft asked that this provision be deleted from the 404(c) 
Regulations, in part because "sponsors would rather retain fiduci-
ary responsibility for contributions as to which participants and 
beneficiaries have not submitted instructions than avail themselves 
of the relief described in the proposal.,,221 In addition, "the com-
ments and the statistical evidence submitted indicated that very few 
plans providing for direction by participants and beneficiaries of-
fered the vehicles specified, and that for plans which did, a 
negligible amount of plan assets directed into such options.,,222 In 
other words, employer protection in default investment situations 
was unnecessary. 
The next version of the 404(c) Regulations, issued in 1991, 
omitted the default investment option provision.223 By this time, 
commentators on the regulations were having second thoughts, 
and requested that the Department of Labor reinstate a default 
investment provision extending relief from liability to employers 
where the participant failed to make an affirmative investment di-
rection. 224 The Department of Labor considered this suggestion 
and expressly rejected it in the final 404(c) Regulations in 1992.225 
The agency emphasized its position that the employer would re-
main responsible for investment decisions unless or until an 
affirmative investment direction was made by the participant. 226 
The Department of Labor's official interpretation of the final 
404(c) Regulations provides some guidance concerning the mean-
ing of an affirmative investment direction. Merely disclosing to 
participants in the summary plan description where their 401 (k) 
plan money will be invested if they fail to provide investment direc-
tions is insufficient to rise to the level of an affirmative investment 
direction.227 Under this interpretation, mere inaction by the par-
ticipant can never rise to the level of an affirmative investment 
direction, no matter how well-informed the participant may be 
concerning the consequences of his failure to act. In contrast, if 
219. ld. 
220. ld. 
221. Final Regulation Regarding Participant Directed Individual Account Plans, 57 Fed. 
Reg. 46,906, 46,923 (Oct. 13, 1992) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l). 
222. ld. 
223. ld. 
224. See id. 
225. ld. 
226. See id. 
227. ld. at 46,924. 
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the participant "signs an instruction form specifying how assets in 
his account will be invested" in the absence of his affirmative direc-
tion, this act of written consent can operate as an affirmative 
investment direction.22M The circumstances surrounding this writ-
ten consent, however, must indicate that the participant'S consent 
was both informed and voluntary.229 
In the sixth hypothetical, Employee A never gave her written 
consent to Employer's default investment option. Therefore, a 
federal court hearing this type of case must go on to address two 
more issues. These issues concern the statutory interpretation of 
ERISA's fiduciary duty and remedy provisions. 
Even though the 404(c) Regulations are not available as a 
defense to the Employer, to prevail on her claim, Employee A 
must still establish that investing her contributions in the money 
market fund was a breach of the Employer's duty of prudent 
diversification of plan assets under ERISA section 404(a)(1)(c).23o 
The statutory language of section 404(a) (1) (c) raises two 
interpretive issues. First, did Employer fail to diversify the account 
by investing the 401 (k) plan assets in a safe, but low-earning, 
money market fund?231 If so, was Employer's decision to invest all 
of the account in the money market fund nevertheless prudent 
under the circumstances? Here the sixth hypothetical highlights 
the ambiguity in the statutory description of Employer's duty of 
prudent diversification of plan assets. In the hypothetical, 
Employer's default investment option, a money market fund, 
minimizes the risk of a loss of principal. It should be noted, 
though, that at least one federal court has interpreted section 
404(a) (l)(c) expansively, ruling that the duty of prudent 
diversification of plan assets is not strictly limited to a loss of 
principal but may apply to other types of risk as well.232 
From a policy perspective, a federal court's task in interpreting 
the statutory language is difficult because at the time the statute 
228. Id. 
229. Id. 
230. The plan participant bears the initial burden of proving that the fiduciary respon-
sible for investing the plan's assets failed to diversify the investments. See Metzler v. Graham, 
112 F.3d 207, 209 (5th Cir. 1997); In re Unisys Sav. Plan Litig., 74 F.3d 421, 438-40 (3d Cir. 
1996); H.R. CONF. REp. No. 93-1280, at 304 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.CAN. 5038, 
5084. Once this initial burden of proof has been satisfied, the burden then shifts to the 
fiduciary to prove that their investment decisions were prudent under the circumstances. See 
H.R. CONF. REp. No. 93-1280, at 304, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.CAN. at 5084. 
231. See Barnhart, supra note 212 (finding that eighty percent of 401 (k) plan accounts 
automatically enrolled by the employer are invested in low-yielding money market funds). 
232. GlW Indus. v. Trevor, Stewart, Burton &Jacobson, Inc., lO Employee Benefits Cas. 
(BNA) 2290,2300-04 (S.D. Ga. 1989), affd, 895 F.2d 729, 731 (11th Cir. 1990). 
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was drafted, the 401 (k) plan did not exist. As a result, the statutory 
interpretation approach that relies on "plain meaning" becomes 
inherently unreliable. As instructed by Congress, the federal courts 
must seek to interpret the statutory language "bearing in mind the 
special nature and purpose" of 401 (k) plans.233 
ERISA section 404(a) (1) (c) was written with a different type of 
retirement plan in mind: the traditional defined benefit plan in 
which the employer is responsible for investing the plan's assets. 234 
In this type of plan, the amount of the participant's eventual re-
tirement benefits is not dependent on plan investment earnings. If 
the plan's assets lose money, the employer remains financially re-
sponsible so that the participants will receive their promised levels 
ofbenefits. 235 In the event the employer is unable to pay the prom-
ised benefits, the benefits are federally insured by the Pension 
Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). 236 In this context, the em-
ployer's fiduciary duty to diversifY and thereby avoid the "risk of 
large losses" is sound policy. It preempts the type of catastrophic 
losses that would undermine both the employer's ability to pay 
and, ultimately, the fiscal soundness of the PBGC insurance pro-
gram. 
The retirement benefits under a 401 (k) plan are fundamentally 
different. In a 401 (k) plan, the participant's retirement benefit 
consists of the amount in her 401 (k) plan account at retirement, 
usually paid as a lump sum.237 In the 401 (k) plan context, the risk 
of loss is amenable to at least three possible judicial interpreta-
tions. Loss can be defined as a loss of principal, an inflationary 
loss, or an opportunity loss. 
The difference between a loss of principal and an inflationary 
loss is illustrated by the following example. Assume that the Em-
ployer in the sixth hypothetical had automatically deducted $500 
each month from Employee A's paycheck and contributed this 
amount to her 401 (k) plan account. Mter twenty years, Employee 
A would have accumulated $120,000 in retirement savings attribut-
able solely to contributions. For simplicity of illustration, assume 
that these contributions had been secured in a bank vault, in cash, 
for those twenty years. Employee A has not "lost" one penny on 
her principal amount of $120,000 as an accountant would define 
the term, but in an economic sense, Employee A suffered a very 
233. H.R. CONF. REp. No. 93-1280, at 302 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5083. 
234. LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 19, at 45-46,50-54. 
235. Id. 
236. See supra note 132 and accompanying text. 
237. Reforming ERISA, supra note 52. 
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real injury. Inflation over those twenty years eroded greatly the 
purchasing power of her $120,000, creating an inflationary loss. 
From the perspective of national retirement policy, investing 
401 (k) plan contributions in a money market fund does little to 
enhance the retirement income security of the plan participants. 
The minimal earnings of the money market fund may provide 
some protection against inflationary loss in periods of relatively 
low inflation. But in a money market investment situation, the 
401 (k) plan participants suffer another type of loss-they have 
forgone the greater investment returns produced by a diversified 
portfolio invested prudently and broadly over the long term in the 
equity markets. This forfeiture of greater investment returns is an 
opportunity loss. 
A final consideration in the interpretation of the duty of pru-
dent diversification of plan assets is the employer's likely 
motivation for selecting the money market fund as the default in-
vestment option. Given the certain opportunity loss, such an 
investment is of dubious prudence. Then, why do employers do it? 
Employers fear the potential fiduciary liability for a loss of princi-
pal.238 If the participant's contributions are invested in a money 
market fund, the risk of a loss of principal is eliminated. Absent 
this fear, employers in general would be willing to select a more 
volatile, but in the long run, more rewarding, default investment 
option for their automatic enrollment 401 (k) plans. Part III dem-
onstrates how, through interpretation of ERISA's remedy 
provisions, the federal courts can encourage employers to select 
default investment options that minimize the risk of opportunity 
losses for the employees who are enrolled automatically in 401 (k) 
plans. 
b. The Sore Loser Scenario-It should be evident that the 404(c) 
Regulations will be available as an employer defense in ERISA fi-
duciary litigation only in a narrow category of cases. The employer 
cannot assert the 404(c) Regulations as a defense to an alleged 
breach of the duty of prudence nor the duty of loyalty.239 In addi-
tion, the defense is not available where the participant never 
affirmatively directed the investment of her 401 (k) plan account.240 
The narrow category of cases where the 404(c) Regulations are 
available as an employer defense are the "sore loser" cases. The 
sore loser scenario assumes that the participant affirmatively di-
rected the investment of her 401 (k) plan account. It further 
238. Barnhart, supra note 212. 
239. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
240. See supra notes 200-01 and accompanying text. 
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assumes that the employer fulfilled its duty of prudence in select-
ing the plan's investment options and that there is no allegation 
that the employer's decision was tainted by self-interest. With these 
underlying assumptions in mind, the seventh hypothetical de-
scribes a sore loser case. 
SEVENTH HYPOTHETICAL 
Employer establishes a 401 (k) plan. Encouraged by spectacular in-
vestment returns in prior years, Employee A invests 100 % of her 
401 (k) plan account in a high technology stock mutual fund. 
In 2005, Employee A is ready to retire. She is upset that her retirement 
benefit from the 401 (k) plan is less than the amount of her contribu-
tions made to the plan over the years, that is, that her 401(k) plan 
investment in the high technology stock fund has lost money. 
Employee A sues Employer for breach of its fiduciary duty of prudent 
diversification under ERISA, seeking to recoup her investment losses. 
The Employer defends by asserting that it complied with the 404(c) 
Regulations and therefore is not liable for Employee A's investment 
losses. The question presented to the federal court is whether Employer 
has "complied" with the 404( c) Regulations. 
The discussion below presents a general overview of the em-
ployer's defense under the 404(c) Regulations. In keeping with the 
premise of this Article, areas where broad policy-making discretion 
is conferred upon the federal court are highlighted and dis-
cussed.241 The exercise of this discretion is likely to have a 
significant and sweeping impact on national retirement policy for 
the foreseeable future. 
(i). The Framework of the Employer's 404(c) Regulations DeJense-
There are three basic plan design requirements under the 404(c) 
Regulations. First, the plan must offer a broad and diversified 
range of at least three investment options to plan participants (the 
diversified range rule).242 The purpose of the diversified range rule 
is to ensure that participants have the opportunity to avoid the risk 
of incurring large investment losses by diversifying their account 
241. The reader interested in the technical nuances of the 404(c) Regulations should 
consult the footnotes accompanying this discussion and the original sources cited therein. 
242. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c·1 (b) (1) (ii), (b) (3) (2000). 
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portiolio.243 Each investment option must present materially differ-
ent risk and return characteristics.244 Other than these criteria, the 
404(c) Regulations leave the selection of specific types of invest-
ment options up to the fiduciary discretion of the sponsoring 
employer. 245 
Second, the plan must allow participants to transfer the assets in 
their account into and out of the various plan investment options 
with a frequency that is reasonable in light of the market volatility 
of those investment options (the general volatility rule).246 At a 
minimum, the plan participants must be allowed to make transfers 
among at least three of the investment options not less frequently 
than every three months (the three-month minimum rule).247 The 
underlying purpose of the general volatility and three-month 
minimum rules, is to allow the plan participants to minimize large 
investment losses by quickly transferring out of sinking invest-
ments.248 Subject to the three-month minimum rule, the 404(c) 
Regulations leave the determination of how frequently the partici-
pants are allowed to transfer investments up to the fiduciary 
discretion of the sponsoring employer.249 
Third, the plan's investment options must permit participants to 
actually diversifY the investment of their plan accounts (the actual 
diversification rule).250 Under the actual diversification rule, the 
plan's design must take into account how the small size of partici-
pants' account balances may limit their ability to achieve 
investment diversification.251 In particular, if the plan's investment 
options are limited to individual stocks or bonds, participants with 
243. Final Rule Regarding Participant Directed Individual Account Plans, 57 Fed. Reg. 
46,906,46,918-9 (Oct. 13, 1992) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 2550404c-1). 
244. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1 (b) (3). 
245. Earlier drafts of the 404(c) Regulations are more specific concerning the types of 
investment options offered. These proposed rules were eliminated in the final regulation to 
preserve employer flexibility. Final Regulation Regarding Participant Directed Individual 
Account Plans, 57 Fed. Reg. at 46,919-20. 
246. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c·l (b)(2) (ii) (C). There are two alternative methods for satisfying 
the general volatility rule. One is to require at least a single core investment option to accept 
transfers coming in (that is, a transfer out of a volatile investment must be able to go some-
where else) at least as frequently as any volatile investment, where transfers are allowed in 
excess of every three months. [d. § 2550.404c-l (b) (2) (ii) (C) (2) (i). An alternative method of 
compliance is to establish a cash-equivalency fund that receives and holds transfers out of a 
volatile investment until the next transfer period arrives. [d. § 2550.404c-l (b) (2) (ii) (C) (2) (ii). 
247. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l(b)(ii)(C)(I). 
248. Final Rule Regarding Participant Directed Individual Account Plans, 57 Fed. Reg. 
at 46,914-15. 
249. See id. 
250. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l (b) (3)(i)(C). 
25l. [d.; Final Regulation Regarding Participant Directed Individual Account Plans, 57 
Fed. Reg. at 46,920. 
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small account balances will be unable to achieve a diversified ac-
count portfolio.252 To satisfY the actual diversification rule, the plan 
can offer "look-through investment vehicles" (for example, mutual 
funds)253 as investment options.254 Actual diversification is then de-
termined by looking through to the assets underlying the 
investment vehicle. It is the actual diversification rule that results 
in the selection of mutual funds as investment options for almost 
all 401 (k) plans.255 
Although company stock is not considered a suitable investment 
option for purposes of satisfYing the diversified range rule, the 
404(c) Regulations expressly permit the employer to offer plan 
participants company stock as an additional investment option.256 
Certain additional rules apply to plans that offer company stock as 
an investment option.257 The fundamental purpose of these special 
rules is to ensure that the investment decisions made by the plan 
participants are truly independent and not subject to undue influ-
ence by the employer.258 
First, company stock offered as an investment option must be 
publicly traded. 259 The purpose of the publicly traded requirement 
is to ensure that the 401 (k) plan participants can buy and sell the 
company stock in a market that is free from influence by the em-
ployer.260 Second, the plan must have procedures in place to 
safeguard the confidentiality of information relating to the pur-
chase, sale, and holding of company stock by participants.261 Third, 
the plan must designate a fiduciary to monitor compliance with 
252. Final Rule Regarding Participant Directed Individual Account Plans, 57 Fed. Reg. 
at 46,920-21,46,921 n.19. 
253. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l(e)(l)(i). 
254. Final Rule Regarding Participant Directed Individual Account Plans, 57 Fed. Reg. 
at 46,921. 
255. Recently it has become more common for 401 (k) plans to allow participants to in-
vest in individual stocks besides employer securities, or in more volatile sector funds limited 
to technology or internet stocks. Employers Should Muue with Caution on Internet Stocks, DE-
FINED CONTRIBUTION NEWS, Aug. 16, 1999, at 6; Linton, supra note 49; Hewitt Associates, 
supra note 41. 
256. Final Rule Regarding Participant Directed Individual Account Plans, 57 Fed. Reg. 
at 46,919. 
257. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l (d)(2)(ii) (E)(4). 
258. Final Rule Regarding Participant Directed Individual Account Plans, 57 Fed. Reg. 
at 46,922. 
259. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l (d)(2)(ii) (E)(4)(iii). To satisfY this requirement, the com-
pany stock must be traded either on a national exchange or in another generally 
recognized market. Final Rule Regarding Participant Directed Individual Account Plans, 57 
Fed. Reg. at 46,927. 
260. Final Regulation Regarding Participant Directed Individual Account Plans, 57 Fed. 
Reg. at 46,927. 
261. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l (d) (2) (ii) (E)( 4)(vii). 
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these confidentiality procedures.262 This designated monitoring 
fiduciary, however, is not required to be independent of the em-
ployer.263 If the monitoring fiduciary finds that there is there is 
potential for undue influence despite the existence of such proce-
dures, the monitoring fiduciary must appoint an independent 
third-party fiduciary to handle 401 (k) plan transactions involving 
company stock.264 Typical situations likely to trigger the appoint-
ment of an independent fiduciary are tender offers, exchange 
offers, and contested elections for directors.265 . 
In addition to the three basic plan design requirements, the 
404(c) Regulations require that the employer (or its agent)266 pro-
vide participants certain types of information concerning the plan 
and its investment options. The purpose of these informational 
requirements is to "ensure that participants and beneficiaries in 
ERISA section 404(c) plans have sufficient information to make 
informed investment decisions.,,267 One set of informational re-
quirements mandates the types of information that must be 
supplied to all plan participants (mandatory information). 266 The 
other set of informational requirements prescribes the additional 
types of information that must be provided only if a plan partici-
pant requests it (upon request information) .269 
The mandatory information category includes: (1) an 
explanation that the plan is intended to constitute an ERISA 
section 404(c) plan and that plan fiduciaries may be relieved of 
liability for losses which are the result of participants' investment 
instructions; (2) a description of the investment alternatives 
available under the plan, including a general description of the 
investment objectives and risk and return characteristics of each 
alternative; (3) an explanation of how to give investment 
instructions, any limits or restrictions on giving instructions, and 
262. [d. § 2550A04c-l (d)(2)(ii)(E) (4) (viii). 
263. Final Regulation Regarding Participant Directed Individual Account Plans, 57 Fed. 
Reg. at 46,926. Earlier drafts of the proposed 404(c) Regulations had required an inde-
pendent fiduciary. [d. 
264. [d. at 46,926-27. 
265. [d. at 46,927. 
266. 29 C.F.R. § 2550A04c-l (b)(2)(i)(B); see also Final Regulation Regarding Partici-
pant Directed Individual Account Plans, 57 Fed. Reg. at 46,910 ("[TJhere is nothing in the 
regulation which precludes a plan fiduciary from designating another person or persons to 
actually furnish the required information ... ."). 
267. Final Regulation Regarding Participant Directed Individual Account Plans, 57 Fed. 
Reg. 46,906, 46,909-10 (Oct. 13, 1992) (codified at 29 C.F:R. § 2550A04c-l). I have ques-
tioned strongly elsewhere whether the 404(c) Regulations in fact fulfill this objective. 
Medill, supra note 22, at 35-36,63-64. 
268. 29 C.F.R. § 2550A04c-l (b) (2) (i) (B) (1) (2000). 
269. [d. § 2550.404c-l (b)(2)(i)(B)(2). 
526 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 34:3 
any restrictions on the exercise of voting, tender or similar rights; 
(4) a description of any transaction fees or expenses that are 
charged to the participant's account; and (5) a description of the 
additional information that is available on request and the identity 
of the person(s) responsible for providing that information.27o If 
the participant invests in a vehicle that is subject to federal 
securities laws, the participant must be given a copy of the most 
recent prospectus (unless the prospectus was furnished 
immediately before the participant'S investment).271 If the 
investment involves the exercise of voting, tender, or similar rights, 
and these rights are passed through to participants, the participant 
also must receive any materials related to the exercise of these 
rights. 272 
The "upon request" information category includes: (1) a de-
scription of the annual operating expenses of the plan's 
investment alternatives, including any investment management 
fees; (2) copies of any prospectuses, financial statements and re-
ports and other information furnished to the plan relating to an 
investment alternative; (3) list of assets comprising the portfolio of 
each of the investment alternatives that hold plan assets; 
(4) information concerning the value of shares or units in invest-
ment alternatives available under the plan along with information 
concerning the past and current investment performance of each 
alternative; and (5) information concerning the value of shares or 
units in investment alternatives held in the account of the partici-
pant. 273 
Although the 404(c) Regulations clearly are based on the as-
sumption that the informational requirements will enable 
participants to make informed investment decisions,274 the regula-
tions do not require the employer to provide plan participants 
. th . th . d' 275. d' 276 WI el er mvestment e ucatlOn or mvestment a Vlce. 
270. Id. § 2550.404c-l (b)(2)(i) (B) (1). 
271. Id. 
272. Id. 
273. Id. § 2550.404c-l (b)(2)(i) (B)(2). 
274. Medill, supra note 22, at 63-66. 
275 .. See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l(b)(2) (i)(B)(I),(2) (listing mandatory and upon re-
quest disclosure information that must be provided to plan participants). 
276. 29 C.F.R. § 2550A04c-l (c)(4); Final Regulation Regarding Participant Directed 
Individual Account Plans, 57 Fed. Reg. at 46,922. Recent caselaw developments have caused 
experts in the employee benefits community to question whether ERISA's general fiduciary 
duty of prudence requires the employer to provide more and different types of information 
to plan participants than the mandatory and upon request information required by the 
404(c) Regulations. See generaUy, William J. Arnone, A New Fiduciary Challenge to 401(k) Plan 
SPOnsfffS, BENEFITS Q., Apr. I, 1999, at 49 (1999) (suggesting strategies for dealing with the 
increased necessity for employee financial education as a means of establishing a defense to 
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(ii). Policy Making by the Federal Courts in Interpreting the 404(c) 
Regulations--Given the discretion the federal courts hold in inter-
preting the 404(c) Regulations, it is important to recall the first set 
of competing policy choices presented in this Article-employer 
burden versus participant protection.277 The Department of La-
bor's official interpretations of the 404(c) Regulations appear to 
weigh heavily on the side of participant protection. These official 
interpretations lie in three key areas. 
If faced with a sore loser case under the 404(c) Regulations, a 
natural reaction by a federal judge unschooled in the history and 
nuances of ERISA may be to start from the presumption (spoken 
or unspoken) that the plan participants "assumed the risk" of loss 
when they directed the investment of their accounts. Contrary to 
this intuitive reaction, ERISA historically and fundamentally pro-
tects plan participants by placing the fiduciary responsibility for 
ensuring the integrity of plan assets on the sponsoring employer.278 
Generally, ERISA's fiduciary protections cannot be waived by plan 
participants, nor can the plan's fiduciaries be absolved from fidu-
ciary liability for breach of their duties by the terms of the plan's 
. d ( ) 279 governmg ocument s . 
The first key Department of Labor interpretation of the 404(c) 
Regulations is rooted firmly in these fundamental and overarching 
ERISA fiduciary principles. In the preamble to the final 404(c) 
Regulations, the Department of Labor states that ERISA section 
404(c) is similar to a statutory exception to the general fiduciary 
provisions of ERISA and, accordingly, "the person asserting applicabil-
ity of the exception will have the burden of proving that the conditions of 
sections 404( c) and any regulation thereunder have been met.,,280 Thus, 
the employer who asserts a 404(c) Regulations defense bears the 
burden of proof. 
The second key Department of Labor interpretation of the 
404(c) Regulations concerns the scope of the employer's exemp-
tion from fiduciary liability. The Department of Labor views ERISA 
section 404(c) as a transactional exemption, as opposed to a blanket, 
plan-wide exemption. This means that 
allegations of a breach of fiduciary duty under section 404(c». A discussion of this issue, 
which has yet to be addressed by the federal courts, is beyond the scope of this Article. For 
one perspective, see Sayles, supra note 6, at 1493-98. 
277. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text. 
278. See 29 U.S.c. § l104(a) (1994); Final Regulation Regarding Participant Directed 
Individual Account Plans; 57 Fed. Reg. at 46,906-07. 
279. 29 U.S.C. § 1110(a) (1994); A.BA EMPLOYEE BENEFITS COMM., supra note 12, at 
344-46. 
280. Final Regulation Regarding Participant Directed Individual Account Plans, 57 Fed. 
Reg. at 46,906 (emphasis added). 
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[t] he relief from the fiduciary responsibility provisions of 
ERISA that is provided by section 404(c) applies only to indi-
vidual transactions that meet the criteria established by that 
section, i.e., the transaction must be executed pursuant to the 
kind of plan described in section 404(c) and the participant 
or beneficiary must actually have exercised control with re-
spect to the transaction. Thus, a determination whether 
sections 404 (c)( 1) and (2) apply can only be made on a case by 
b . 281 case aszs. 
In other words, the federal courts are instructed to look at the 
individual circumstances of each participant, rather than reviewing 
(and dismissing) the claims of the plan's participants as a whole.282 
The third key Department of Labor interpretation concerns the 
nature of the employer's burden of proof. During the notice and 
comment process for the 404(c) Regulations, several commenta-
tors suggested that the Department of Labor adopt a reading of 
the Regulations as a "safe harbor.,,283 Adoption of the 404(c) Regu-
lations as a safe harbor would have allowed an employer who failed 
to comply with its terms to argue that "the particular plan and any 
particular participant-directed transaction" fell within the statutory 
exemption of ERISA section 404(c).284 The Department of Labor 
explicitly rejected this proposed safe harbor interpretation of the 
statute.285 Consequently, if the employer fails to comply with the 
requirements of the 404(c) Regulations, the liability exemption of 
ERISA section 404(c) is not available as an employer defense. 
The 404(c) Regulations are replete with adjectives that invite 
the exercise of judicial discretion, particularly in the area of 
judicial fact-finding.286 Judicial interpretation of terms such as 
281. [d. (emphasis added). 
282. Such an intensive factual inquiry presents two practical problems for the federal 
judiciary. First, it is likely to present difficulties in the certification and trial of class action 
lawsuits involving the 404(c) Regulations. Second, it is likely to consume a significant 
amount of judicial resources, particularly at the district court level, where the federal judge 
acts as the trier of fact. These practical problems of case docket management, however, 
should not deter the federal courts from assuming the significant policy making role that 
has been delegated to them by the Department of Labor through the 404(c) Regulations. 
See infra Part III.B. 
283. Final Regulation Regarding Participant Directed Individual Account Plans, 57 Fed. 
Reg. at 46,907. 
284. [d. 
285. [d. 
286. It is worth reemphasizing here that in ERISA fiduciary litigation there is no jury 
trial, and the court is the trier offact. See supra note 12. 
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"reasonable,,,287 "material,,,288 "improper" or "undue" employer 
influence,289 and, most discretionary of all, "depends on the facts 
and circumstances of the particular case"290 will determine the 
employer's compliance with the 404(c) Regulations. Judicial 
discretion also applies in the evaluation of the employer's fiduciary 
decisions concerning the diversified range and general volatility 
rules governing the investment options offered under the plan.291 
It is through this grant of broad judicial discretion that the De-
partment of Labor effectively delegated its policy-making role to 
the federal courts. Whether such delegation of agency policy-
making authority to the federal courts is necessarily improper or 
inappropriate is beyond the scope of this Article. Rather, this Arti-
cle argues that the federal courts should acknowledge and accept 
the significant role they play in shaping national retirement policy. 
The federal courts have an enormous degree of flexibility in deal-
ing with individual cases involving 401 (k) plans. This flexibility, 
depending on how it is asserted, can either promote or undermine 
national retirement policy. To ignore, either unknowingly or will-
ingly, the broader policy implications of judicial decisions in ruling 
on individual cases is simply irresponsible. 
The 404(c) Regulations invite the federal courts to engage in 
three distinct areas of policy making for 401 (k) plans. The first two 
areas are plan structural policy and plan operational policy. The third 
area of judicial policy making involves company stock situations in 
which the employer potentially exercises undue influence over the 
287. Judicial inquiry into reasonableness will be necessary when: considering whether 
to allow the employer to charge the expenses of carrying out investment instructions to the 
participant's account, 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l (b)(2)(ii)(A) (2000); specifying the fre-
quency with which participants must be allowed to transfer out of volatile investments under 
the general volatility rule, id. § 2550.404c-l (b) (2) (ii) (C); specifying the opportunity that 
must be given to the participants to exercise voting, tender, or other rights associated with 
the ownership of employer securities, id. § 2550.404c-l (c) (1) (ii); or, regulating transactions 
involving a plan fiduciary, id. § 2550.404c·l (c)(3). 
288. Judicial inquiry into materiality will arise under: the diversified range rule, id. 
§ 2550.404c·l (b) (3), and the provisions preventing the exercise of independent participant 
control if the plan fiduciary concealed private facts not otherwise prohibited from disclosure 
under federal or state securities laws, id. § 2550.404c·l (c) (2) (ii). 
289. Judicial inquiry concerning the improper influence of an employer will arise in 
the context of any participant transactions, including the exercise of ownership rights in-
volving employer securities, id. § 2550.404c-l (c)(2)(i), or the necessity for appointment of 
an independent fiduciary, id. § 2550.404c-l (d)(2)(ii) (£)( 4)(ix). 
290. The 404(c) Regulations require that the participant must have, in fact, exercised 
independent investment control. Id. § 2550.404c-l (c)(l)(i). The regulations specifically 
state that " [wlhether a participant or beneficiary has exercised independent control in fact 
with respect to a transaction depends on the facts and circumstances of the particular case." 
Id. § 2550.404c-l (c) (2). 
291. See supra Part II.B.3.b. 
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401 (k) plan participants. This third area is plan fiduciary policy. 
Each type of judicial policy making is discussed below. 
Plan structural policy centers around the design of the 401 (k) 
plan itself. It involves questions such as whether the plan's invest-
ment options satisfy the diversified range rule,292 or whether the 
plan's investment transfer rules comply with the general volatility 
rule.293 Plan structural policy issues are characterized by their focus 
on the plan's design features, which are determined by the docu-
ments that establish the 401 (k) plan itself.294 
If the federal court determines that a plan design feature fails to 
meet the requirements of the 404(c) Regulations, the plan as a 
whole is "flawed.,,295 Ajudicial ruling that a 401 (k) plan has a struc-
tural flaw has consequences both at the level of the individual 
litigants in the action and, more importantly, the industry level. At 
the level of individual litigants, every participant in the 401 (k) plan 
will have the opportunity to assert a sore loser claim against the 
employer. This result occurs because a plan structural flaw affects 
every plan participant. Under the Department of Labor's interpre-
tation of the 404(c) Regulations, a plan structural flaw eliminates 
the employer's ability to assert a section 404(c) defense to such 
claims with respect to all of the participants in the 401 (k) plan.296 
The employer will be deemed responsible (and thus liable) for any 
investment losses incurred by each participant account that was 
292. 29 C.F.R. §§ 2550.404c-2(b) (1) (ii),(b)(3). 
293. Id. § 2550.404c-2(b) (2) (ii) (C). 
294. 29 U.S.C. § 1l02(a)(l) (1994); 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l(b). 
295. Final Rule Regarding Participant Directed Individual Account Plans, 57 Fed. Reg. 
46,906, 46,906 (Oct. 13, 1992) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l). The Department of 
Labor's commentary accompanying the finaI404(c) Regulations states: 
The relief from the fiduciary responsibility provisions of ERISA that is provided by 
section 404(c) applies only to individual transactions that meet the criteria estab-
lished by that section, i.e., the transaction must be executed pursuant to the kind of plan 
described in section 404(c) and the participant or beneficiary must actually have exer-
cised control with respect to the transaction. 
Id. at 46,906 (emphasis added). A structural design feature that fails to meet the criteria 
established by the 404(c) Regulations will cause the plan to fail to qualify as an "ERISA sec-
tion 404(c) plan." 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l (b). Thus, every participant transaction will fail to 
meet the standards for relief from the fiduciary responsibility provisions established by the 
404(c) Regulations. 
296. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1 (b). The Department of Labor considered and expressly 
rejected a proposed interpretation of section 404(c) that characterized the regulations as 
merely establishing a safe harbor. Final Rule Regarding Participant Directed Individual 
Account Plans, 57 Fed. Reg. at 46,907. Consequently, an employer who fails to satisfy all of 
the 404(c) Regulation's criteria cannot argue that "the particular plan and any particular 
participant directed transaction executed pursuant to such plan falls within the statutory 
definition. Id. at 46,907. 
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not prudently diversified. 297 This employer liability attaches even 
though the employer has never exercised control over the invest-
ments in the participant's 401 (k) plan account. 298 
A judicial ruling that a 401 (k) plan is structurally flawed will 
have a second effect at the industry level. The full service providers 
who sell 401 (k) plans to employers typically offer a menu of stan-
dardized planl99 for their customers.300 These standardized plans are 
easy, and thus inexpensive, for the employer to establish and for 
the service provider to administer. 301 Standardized plans use the 
same basic set of plan documents and have a limited number of 
options concerning the plan's design features. 302 Thus, a ruling by 
a federal court that one employer's standardized 401 (k) plan is 
structurally flawed potentially sets up collateral estoppel claims for 
participants in the hundreds, or even thousands, of virtually iden-
tical 401(k) plans sold by the same service provider. Such lawsuits 
brought on a wide scale will have a significant chilling effect on the 
future establishment of 401 (k) plans by employers. Given the sig-
nificance of 401 (k) plans to national retirement policy, the federal 
courts should consider carefully the potential adverse impact of 
such a chilling effect.303 
Plan operational policy centers around the actual day-to-day ad-
ministration of the plan. Plan operational policy questions are 
intensely factual in nature. They are characterized by a focus on 
whether the performance of the persons responsible for operating 
the plan, in fact, lived up to the standards set forth in the 404(c) 
Regulations. An example of a plan operational policy question is 
whether a participant was provided with all of the required manda-
tory information proscribed by the 404 (c) Regulations. Again, 
297. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1)(C) (1994); Final Rule Regarding Participant Directed In-
dividual Account Plans, 57 Fed. Reg. at 46,906 ("It is the Department's view that section 
404(c) is similar to a statutory exception to the general fiduciary provisions of ERISA and, 
accordingly, the person asserting applicability of the exception will have the burden of 
proving that conditions of section 404(c) and any regulations thereunder have been met."). 
298. See sources cited supra note 297. 
299. There are two types of standardized retirement plans. Prototype plans generally con-
sist of a governing plan document and an adoption agreement that allows the employer to 
select among a limited number of optional plan features. David A. Hildebrandt & William 
H. Cowper, Qualified Plans-IRS Determination Letter Procedures, 360-2d Tax Mgmt. (BNA) , A-
14 (Feb. 28, 2000). Master plans are set in form and do not offer the employer flexibility in 
terms of selecting plan design features. Id. 
300. LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 19, at 239-40. 
301. Id. 
302. Id. 
303. Cf Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 231-32 (2000) (recognizing that the federal 
judiciary should not act contrary to congressional policy by entertaining ERISA fiduciary 
claims that attack plan structure unconnected to claims of specific harm to plan partici-
pants). 
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under the Department of Labor's interpretation of the 404(c) 
Regulations, an operational flaw will eliminate the employer's abil-
ity to assert a section 404(c) defense. There is one highly 
significant difference, however, between plan structural flaws and 
plan operational flaws. A plan operational flaw eliminates the em-
ployer's Section 404(c) defense only with respect to the individual 
participant( s) affected by the operational errore s), not for all of the partici-
pants in the 401(k) plan;304 a structural flaw eliminates the defense 
with respect to all 401 (k) participants.305 
A sore loser claim involving alleged plan operational flaws raises 
difficult problems of proof for the employer. These evidentiary 
problems arise because of the Department of Labor's position that 
the employer bears the burden of showing compliance with the 
404(c) Regulations.306 As a matter of convenience, the typical em-
ployer delegates the day-to-day operation and administration of 
the 401 (k) plan to a full service provider. 307 Although the Depart-
ment of Labor acknowledges that this practice is widespread, it 
nevertheless maintains that the employer remains ultimately re-
sponsible for ensuring compliance with the 404(c) Regulations.308 
Construed strictly, the Department of Labor's position requires 
the employer to prove actual operational compliance for each in-
dividual participant for every investment transaction. Such a strict 
approach will make the employer's evidentiary burden of proof 
impossible to carry in sore loser litigation. Absent a pattern and 
practice of blatant operational noncompliance, the federal courts 
must decide whether such minute and detailed operational scru-
tiny is necessary or desirable in light of ERISA's policy objectives. 
304. Final Regulation Regarding Participant Directed Individual Account Plans, 57 Fed. 
Reg., 46,906, 46,910 (Oct. 13, 1992) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 2550A04c-l) ("the participant 
... must actually have exercised control with respect to the transaction"). 
305. Seediscussion supra note 295. 
306. Final Regulation Regarding Participant Directed Individual Account Plans, 57 Fed. 
Reg. at 46,910. 
307. I have explained elsewhere why, for financial reasons, the full service provider is 
highly unlikely to be a fiduciary of the plan, and, therefore, cannot be sued for a breach of 
fiduciary duty under ERISA. Medii!, supra note 22, at 38-49. The Supreme Court's recent 
ruling in Harris Trust & Savings Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney Inc., 120 S. Ct. 2180 (2000), 
allows a plan fiduciary to bring suit against a non-fiduciary plan service provider under 
ERISA section 502(a) (3) for engaging in a prohibited transaction. Prohibited Transactions: 
Attorneys Ponder Non-Fiduciary Liability in Aftennath of Harris Trust Ruling, PENSIONS & BENE-
FITS DAILY REp., June 19, 2000, at 27. Although a discussion of the new potential claims 
against non-fiduciary service providers made possible under Harris is beyond the scope of 
this Article, the reader should note that the remedies available to plan participants under 
ERISA section 502(a) (3) are, under current Supreme Court precedent, extremely limited. 
See infra Part lILA. 
308. Final Regulation Regarding Participant Directed Individual Account Plans, 57 Fed. 
Reg., at 46,910. 
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Close judicial scrutiny of the day-to-day administration of any 
401 (k) plan is likely to unveil a few isolated instances of opera-
tional error, even in the best administered plan. Thus, a judicial 
standard of strict scrutiny likely will have a chilling effect on plan 
sponsorship by even the most conscientious of employers. An al-
ternative standard for resolving plan operational policy questions 
permits an employer to satisfy its evidentiary burden of proving 
compliance with the 404(c) Regulations by showing that it had 
procedures in place to monitor periodically the overall operational 
performance of the service provider. The proposed judicial stan-
dard provides a more reasonable approach to resolving ERISA's 
fundamental policy choice between employer burden and partici-
pant protection. An employer's delegation of plan operational 
responsibility to a service provider without any monitoring proce-
dures in place puts plan participants at risk. To require such 
monitoring will not place an undue burden on employers. Rather, 
periodic monitoring of the plan's service provider is already a re-
quired fiduciary responsibility of the employer. 309 If the employer 
fails to assume this fiduciary responsibility, there will be a very real 
consequence under the alternative judicial standard-potential 
employer liability for investment losses in sore loser litigation. 
The alternative standard may be criticized as inconsistent with 
the Department of Labor's interpretation of the 404(c) Regula-
tions as a transactional exemption.31G The response is that although 
the federal courts under Chevron must give deference to the De-
partment of Labor's reasonable interpretation,311 it is exclusively 
the prerogative of the federal courts to determine the types of evi-
dence that the employer can use to attempt to prove compliance. 
The alternative standard is similar to the well-established practice 
of admitting evidence of habit to prove conduct in a particular in-
stance.312 
Finally, if the federal courts consistently rule that 401 (k) plans 
have either structural or operational flaws, the courts will create an 
incentive for participants to select 401 (k) plan investments that are 
not prudently diversified. If plan participants know that they stand 
a good chance of prevailing in sore loser litigation, they have an 
incentive to concentrate their 401 (k) plan investments in high risk 
investment options that potentially carry a large reward. If these 
investments succeed, the participant is rewarded accordingly. If 
309. See supra note 98. 
3lO. See supra note 281 and accompanying text. 
311. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 
(1984). 
312. See FED. R. EVID. 406. 
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these high risk investments fail, the participant has a form of in-
surance against her investment losses in the form of ERISA 
fiduciary litigation against the employer. Encouraging this type of 
participant investment behavior over the long-term will undermine 
the effectiveness of 401 (k) plans in providing retirement income 
security. 
Plan fiduciary policy involves only 401 (k) plans that offer com-
pany stock as an investment option. Under the 404(c) Regulations, 
such plans are subject to special fiduciary rules designed to protect 
participants from undue employer influence in exercising their 
rights as owners of company stock.313 Under these rules the primary 
safeguard for plan participants is the voluntary appointment of an 
independent fiduciary to handle transactions related to company 
stock.314 This appointment must be made by the employer's own 
designated monitoring fiduciary if it is necessary to preserve the 
confidentiality of plan participants in exercising their stock owner-
h· . h 315 S Ip ng ts. 
A judicial standard of strict scrutiny for compliance with the 
special rules for company stock is both necessary and appropriate 
for the federal courts to use in resolving cases invoking plan fidu-
ciary policy issues. 316 Strict judicial scrutiny will send a strong signal 
to the employee benefits community that employers should err on 
the side of caution by appointing an independent fiduciary in 
mergers, acquisitions, and other types of corporate control con-
tests when the employer's 401 (k) plan contains company stock. 
Although the appointment of an independent fiduciary will neces-
sarily place an increased burden on the employer, this burden is 
justified by the need to ensure employers do not improperly or 
unduly influence participants who have invested in company stock. 
Strict judicial scrutiny also is consistent with the employer's fi-
duciary responsibility to select prudently the investment options 
for the 401 (k) plan.317 Mter all, the 404(c) Regulations do not re-
quire the employer to include company stock as an investment 
option; they merely permit it.318 It is not unreasonable for employ-
ers who do decide to include company stock as an investment 
313. See supra notes 259-65 and accompanying text. 
314. See supra note 264 and accompanying text. 
315. See supra note 264 and accompanying text. 
316. H.R. CONF. REp. No. 93-1280, at 305 (1974). reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.CAN. 5038. 
5086 ("The conferees expect that the [404(c)] regulations will provide more stringent stan-
dards with respect to determining whether there is an independent exercise of control 
where the investment may inure to the direct or indirect benefit of the plan sponsor since 
in this case participants might be subject to pressure with respect to investment decisions."). 
317. See supra Part II.B.l.c. 
318. See supra note 256 and accompanying text. 
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option to expect that they will be held accountable for this fiduci-
ary decision. 
Finally, applying a strict scrutiny standard in individual cases 
involving plan fiduciary policy is unlikely to create the same type of 
industry-wide effect as judicial decisions determining plan 
structural or operational policy.319 The facts and circumstances 
surrounding cases giving rise to allegations of undue employer 
influence will be unique to each employer and, therefore, easily 
distinguishable from subsequent cases. 
III. REMEDIES 
Nowhere is the federal courts' impact on national policy more 
evident than in the area of ERISA remedies. 320 Supreme Court in-
terpretations of ERISA's remedy provisions have created several 
novel remedy issues the federal courts must address in future 
401 (k) plan fiduciary litigation. 
The history of ERISA teaches that resolution of these issues is 
likely to have a significant impact on national retirement policy. 
The most prominent historical example of how judicial interpreta-
tions of ERISA remedies can negatively impact national policy lies 
in the health care area. In that context the federal courts have, 
through their interpretations of ERISA's remedy provisions, con-
tributed to the situation where the claims of health care plan 
participants are routinely dismissed for lack of a remedy under 
ERISA,321 and where the persons who administer health care plans 
are not legally accountable for what is perceived by many observers 
to be self-dealing or even fraudulent misconduct, particularly by 
health maintenance organizations.322 
Will the future hold the same for national retirement policy? 
Much will depend on how the federal courts interpret and apply 
ERISA's remedy provisions to 401 (k) plans. 
319. See supra Part Il.B.3.b. 
320. This discussion of available remedies under ERISA is limited to the situation 
where a plan participant brings a breach of fiduciary duty claim against the plan's sponsor-
ing employer. Remedies potentially available in other contexts, such as where a plan 
fiduciary brings an ERISA claim against a co-fiduciary or a non-fiduciary service provider, 
are beyond the scope of this Article. 
321. E.g., Turner v. Fallon Cmty. Health Plan, Inc., 127 F.3d 196, 198-200 (1st Cir. 
1997); McLeod v. Oregon Lithoprint, Inc., 102 F.3d 376, 378-79 (9th Cir. 1996). 
322. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 233-34 (2000) (holding that health mainte-
nance organization reforms are a matter for Congress, not the federal courts). 
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A. Supreme Court Interpretations of ERISA Remedies 
If a federal court finds that a breach of fiduciary duty has oc-
curred, two remedy provisions potentially apply. The first, ERISA 
section 502 (a) (2), operates in tandem with section 409 by author-
izing "appropriate relief under section 409" for plan participants.323 
ERISA section 409 (a) states in relevant part: 
Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who 
breaches any of the responsibilities, obligations, or duties im-
posed upon fiduciaries by this subchapter shall be personally 
liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan result-
ing from each such breach, and to restore to such plan any 
profits of such fiduciary which have been made through use 
of assets of the plan by the fiduciary, and shall be subject to 
such other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem 
appropriate, including removal of such fiduciary.324 
The second remedy provision, section 502(a)(3), authorizes a par-
ticipant to "e~oin any act or practice which violates any provision 
of this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or ... to obtain other 
appropriate equitable relief . . . redress such violations or . . . to 
enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the 
I ,,325 pan. 
A series of Supreme Court decisions interpreting these provi-
sions has led to divergent paths. As interpreted by the Supreme 
Court, section 502(a) (2) authorizes only relief payable to the plan 
itself,326 whereas section 502(a)(3) authorizes relief to individual 
plan participants.327 The two sections also differ as to the type of 
relief that may be awarded. Under section 502(a)(2), money dam-
ages are available in addition to disgorgement of profits and other 
appropriate equitable remedies.328 Under section 502(a) (3), how-
ever, an individual participant is limited to remedies "traditionally 
viewed as 'equitable,' such as injunction or restitution.,,329 Money 
323. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) (1994 & Supp. II 1996). 
324. Id. § 1109(a). 
325. Id. § 1132(a)(3). 
326. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 144 (1985). 
327. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 509-15 (1996). 
328. 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a). 
329. Mertens v. Hewitt Assoc., 508 U.S. 248, 255 (1993). 
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damages, the "classic form of legal relief," are not an available 
remedy under section 502 (a) (3) .330 
These divergent paths present crucial characterization issues for 
the federal courts. A 401 (k) plan consists of a collection of indi-
vidual accounts, one for each plan participant.331 Thus, a threshold 
issue for the federal courts will be to determine whether the 
401 (k) plan participants are seeking relief for the plan (section 
502(a)(2)) or the individual (section 502(a)(3)). Closely related 
are questions of how to characterize the requested relief to deter-
mine whether it is the type of remedy authorized by the statute. 
Supreme Court precedent does not address the unique remedy 
issues raised by today's fiduciary litigation involving 401 (k) plans. 
In the discussion below, three remedy scenarios are analyzed in 
which the federal courts are most likely to encounter these issues 
in order to highlight the policy implications of possible judicial 
interpretations of ERISA's remedy provisions. Each remedy sce-
nario concludes by suggesting a principled course for the federal 
courts to follow that is in keeping with both the letter and the 
spirit of ERISA. 
B. Remedy Scenarios 
1. The "/ Lost Money" Scenario--In an "I lost money" scenario, 
the plaintiff-participants seek to recover either fees and expenses 
deducted from their accounts or a loss of principal to their 401 (k) 
plan accounts. These losses may be experienced by all participants 
in the 401 (k) plan. For example, a deduction type of loss may 
result from a breach of the duty of prudence because the employer 
selected investment options that charged excessive investment 
management fees to plan participants. Alternatively, the losses may 
be a loss of principal experienced by some, but not all, of the 
401 (k) plan participants. For example, a subset of plan 
participants may have established successfully a breach of the 
employer's duty of prudent diversification of plan assets that 
330. [d. The federal courts have not reached consensus on a principled basis for distin-
guishing between impermissible money damages and permitted equitable remedies under 
section 502(a)(3). See Strom v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 202 F.3d 138, 147-50 (2d Cir. 1999); 
Kerr v. Vatterott & Co., 184 F.3d 938, 944-45 (8th Cir. 1999); Allinder v. Inter-City Prods. 
Corp., 152 F.3d 544, 551-53 (6th Cir. 1998); Farr v. U.S. West Communications, Inc., 151 
F.3d 908, 915-16 (9th Cir. 1998); Ream v. Frey, 107 F.3d 147, 153 n.5 (3d Cir. 1997); Buck-
ley Dement, Inc. v. Travelers Plan Adm'rs, 39 F.3d 784, 787--88 (7th Cir. 1994). 
331. LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 19, at 50. 
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resulted in investment losses to their individual accounts, and the 
employer's defense under the 404(c) Regulations has failed. 
Should the federal courts attempt to distinguish between these 
two examples? One way to draw such a distinction is to say that a 
fiduciary breach that has harmed all of the plan's participants falls 
under the plan-wide remedies of section 502(a) (2), whereas a fi-
duciary breach that affects only some individual plan participants 
falls under the individual relief remedies of section 502(a) (3). A 
closer analysis, however, reveals that this type of line-drawing is su-
perficial. Even though all of the plan participants in the first 
example may have paid excessive investment management fees, 
they are unlikely to have suffered equally from the employer's imprudence. 
The excessive investment fees charged are likely to vary with each 
participant's individual choice of investment options for his ac-
count.332 Therefore, in ordering a remedy that truly restores these 
losses to the "plan," the federal court must look past the plan to 
the loss experienced by each individual participant. 333 What may at 
first appear to be an appealing bright line distinction between the 
two examples in application quickly becomes blurred. In both ex-
amples, the federal court will have to look beyond the symbolism 
of the plan to analyze the amount of the excessive fees that were 
deducted from each participant's individual account. 
There is another, more significant, policy reason for the federal 
courts to treat both examples similarly. If the federal court rules 
that a fiduciary breach affecting fewer than all of the plan's par-
ticipants can only be remedied under section 502(a)(3), the 
limited traditional equitable remedies available under this section 
may leave this subset of participants without any relief at all, or 
"betrayed without a remedy.,,334 Such a result-a fiduciary breach 
with no available remedy-nullifies the fiduciary responsibility 
provisions of ERISA. Such an interpretation sends a clear signal to 
the employee benefits community that employers may disregard 
their statutory obligations with impunity. The long-term policy 
332. Medill, supra note 22, at 58-60. 
333. I view this as means to consider the compounded effect of subsequent lost invest-
ment earnings. See supra note 151 and accompanying text. These subsequent lost investment 
earnings could, however, also be characterized as an opportunity loss. See infra Part III.B.2. 
334. To award relief under section 502 (a)(3) in the second example, the restoration of 
investment losses resulting from the employer's breach of its duty of prudent diversification, 
would be "restitution." Effectively, however, what will be paid is money. When, if ever, an 
award of money in ERISA fiduciary litigation can properly be characterized as restitution 
and not money damages is one of the most contentious issues being litigated in the federal 
courts today. Dana M. Muir, J<."'RlSA Remedies: Chimera or Congressional Compromise?, 81 IOWA L. 
REv. 1,36-38 (1995); see sources cited supra note 330. 
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consequence is likely to be a significant undermining of the effec-
tiveness of 401 (k) plans in providing retirement income security. 
The better judicial interpretation for both examples under the I 
lost money scenario is to view the relief as flowing to the plan in 
accord with section 502(a)(2), so long as the monetary award is 
initially allocated to each participant's plan account rather than to 
his personal pocketbook. Such a distinction easily can be made. In 
both examples above, an award of money damages to the plan will 
be made payable directly to the plan's trustee. The plan trustee will 
then allocate the payment among the participants' individual ac-
counts. The plaintiff-participants will be unable to access their 
litigation award except through the normal operating provisions of 
the plan. By requiring that the damages award must be paid to the 
plan itself, this approach is consistent with ERISA's fundamental 
purpose of protecting and preserving the retirement benefits the 
401 (k) plan provides to its participants. 
2. The I Should Have Earned More Money (Opportunity Loss) 
Scenario-The opportunity loss scenario occurs when the plaintiff-
participants' alleged injury is not that their plan accounts have suf-
fered a loss of principal or excessive fee deductions, but rather that 
their accounts should have earned more money. In essence, their 
retirement benefits, represented by the balance of their 401 (k) 
plan accounts, are less than they otherwise would be because of the 
employer's breach of fiduciary duty. Their loss is one of lost in-
• 335 
vestment opportumty. 
This scenario is likely to arise in the context of automatic en-
rollment 401 (k) plans.336 Recall that in an automatic enrollment 
plan, the employer enrolls all of its eligible employees as partici-
pants and retains fiduciary responsibility for investing the 
contributions of participants who fail to make an affirmative in-
vestment direction. 337 This default investment by the employer is 
usually a safe, low-earning option, such as a stable value or money 
335. An "opportunity loss" measure of damages under ERISA section 409 has been 
used by the federal courts in a variety of other contexts. See GIW Ind. v. Trevor, Stewart, 
Burton & Jacobson , Inc., 895 F.2d 729, 733--34 (11th Cir. 1990); Dardaganis v. Grace Capital 
Inc., 889 F.2d 12~7, 1243--44 (2d Cir. 1989); Donovan v. BieIWirth, 754 F.2d 1049, 1055-56 
(2d Cir. 1985); Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d 270, 281 (2d Cir. 1984); Donovan v. Mazzola, 716 
F.2d 1226, 1232-33 (9th Cir. 1983). But see Kerr v. Vatterott & Co., 184 F.3d 938, 944-45 
(8th Cir. 1999). The federal courts construe any uncertainty in quantifying an opportunity 
loss attributable to a breach of fiduciary duty against the fiduciary, not the injured plan. E.g., 
Dardaganis, 889 F.2d at 1244; Bierwirth, 754 F.2d at 1056. 
336. See supra Part II.B.3.a. 
337. See supra Part II. 
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market mutual fund. 338 Thus, the participant's account never loses 
money, but its investment earnings are far less than they would 
have been had the employer chosen a more diversified range of 
investments. 
On the surface, the opportunity loss scenario represents merely 
questions of semantics. Is an opportunity loss within the meaning 
of section 502(a) (2), and therefore remediable under that provi-
sion? Alternatively, is restoring a lost opportunity closer in nature 
to restitution, and thus an equitable remedy available under either 
section 502(a)(2) or section 502(a)(3)? ERISA's legislative history 
is silent on these questions. 
The deeper policy issue is whether ERISA should remedy an op-
portunity loss type of injury in the 401 (k) plan setting? Here the 
nature of retirement benefits provided by a 401 (k) plan argues 
strongly for a remedy. It is the tax-deferred investment earnings 
that build up inside the 401 (k) plan account, much more than the 
participant's contributions, that will cause the participant's retire-
ment benefit to grow over time to an amount that represents a 
measure of retirement income security.339 Denying a remedy for 
the lost opportunity of greater investment earnings significantly 
undermines the very economic engine that makes 401 (k) plans 
successful. 
How the federal courts resolve this remedy issue will determine 
the fate of automatic enrollment 401 (k) plans. As noted above, if 
the federal courts universally deny a remedy for the participants' 
opportunity losses resulting from the employer's decision to invest 
their undirected accounts in a money market fund, automatic en-
rollment 401 (k) plans with low-earning default investment options 
may become the norm. 
From the perspective of national retirement policy, promoting 
the growth of automatic enrollment plans is desirable because 
more people will be saVing for their retirement.340 Limiting em-
ployer liability by denying participants a remedy for opportunity 
losses would encourage more employers to adopt automatic en-
rollment 401 (k) plans. But will allowing a remedy for the 
participants' opportunity losses necessarily deter the growth of 
automatic enrollment plans? To the contrary, if the federal courts 
provide appropriate advice to the employee benefits community, 
338. PROFIT SHARING/ 401 (K) COUNCIL OF AMERICA, supra note 215; Barnhart, supra 
note 212; Eve Tahmincioglu, Ready or Not, Welcome to the 401(k) Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 
2000, at CI0. 
339. See supra note 88. 
340. See supra note 213. 
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the policy benefits of automatic enrollment plans will not only be 
preserved, but can be greatly enhanced. 
To follow this logic, assume that the federal courts decide that 
the employer in the automatic enrollment example above is liable 
for opportunity losses incurred by plan participants whose undi-
rected accounts were invested in the money market fund. The 
question for the employee benefits community then becomes how 
to counsel an employer to structure its default investment option 
under an automatic enrollment arrangement to best insulate the 
employer from such liability. The federal courts can answer this 
question in advance by providing clear and explicit guidance, or 
advice, concerning the types of investments that will satisfY the 
employer's interrelated fiduciary duties of prudence and prudent 
diversification of plan assets in designing the plan's default invest-
ment option. 
If these duties are fulfilled, over the long-term the participants 
placed in the default investment option are likely to have a much 
larger retirement benefit from their 401 (k) plan account, a clear 
policy benefit. It is possible, of course, that the most prudently se-
lected default investment option may nevertheless result in an 
investment loss. If, however, the employer has satisfied its fiduciary 
duties in structuring the default investment option, it should not 
be liable for an investment loss. Under this approach, clear and 
reliable advice to employers concerning their fiduciary duties in 
selecting a default investment option can reduce significantly the 
potential deterrent effect resulting from a determination that op-
portunity losses are remediable under ERISA. 
Employers predictably will react to clear and reliable judicial ad-
vice by adopting default investment options for their automatic 
enrollment plans that mirror the investment gains of the stock 
market. One obvious choice is an index fund. Another possibility is 
a balanced fund containing a mixture of investments in both 
bonds and equities. Perhaps the most prudent choice will be to 
select a "lifecycle" fund that corresponds to the age of the partici-
pant. If employers adopt these types of default investment options, 
not only will more employees be saving for retirement, but over 
the long-term, participants in the default investment option are 
likely to have much larger 401 (k) plan retirement benefits. Con-
versely, judicial attempts at advicegiving in this area that are 
inconsistent and confused will have a significant chilling effect on 
the future growth of automatic enrollment 401 (k) plans. 
3. The Employer Made Money Off Me ScenariQ-The "employer 
made money off me" scenario occurs in cases in which the 
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employer has breached its duty of loyalty by self-dealing with the 
assets of the 401 (k) plan. This scenario may overlap with both the 
"I lost money" and the "I should have made more money" 
scenarios described above. For example, assume that the accounts 
of the 401 (k) plan participants paid excessive investment 
management fees to their employer, who is itself a plan service 
provider. Under this scenario the plaintiff-participants will have 
suffered a loss of principal, and the employer will have made a 
fi 341 pro It. 
It is also possible that the plaintiff-participants under this sce-
nario may not have suffered a loss of principal, only an 
opportunity loss. For example, the employer unilaterally replaces 
the high-flying stock of another company (Company A) with its 
own lesser performing company stock (Company B). The 401(k) 
plan participants who used to hold Company A stock do not lose 
money on their Company A stock, but they would have had a 
greater investment return if they had been allowed to retain their 
Company A stock instead.342 
As in the opportunity loss scenario, the question arises as to how 
to define the "profit" that the employer must disgorge under sec-
tion 502(a)(2). The profit made by the employer's breach in the 
second example above is difficult to measure. Must there have 
been a profit in the revenue/accounting sense? Will a rise in the 
employer's company stock price due to increased demand created 
by a large purchase for the 401 (k) plan constitute a profit? Or does 
any benefit to the employer that is more than incidental constitute 
a profit? Whatever measure of profit the federal courts adopt, any 
ambiguities should be construed against the disgorging em-
ployer.343 
Fiduciary claims involving an employer's self-dealing in 401 (k) 
plan assets also relate to whether the participants' claims are re-
mediable under section 502(a) (2) or section· 502(a) (3).344 A 
federal court has yet to rule that disgorgement of profits by the 
employer falls within the Supreme Court's narrow interpretation 
of "traditional equitable remedies" available to a plan participant 
341. CJ. Mehling v. New York Life Ins. Co., No. 99-CV-5417 (E.D. Pa. June 14,2000, 
amended July 25, 2000) (presenting similar factual allegations), available at 
http://www.newyorklifesuit.com/complaint.doc (last visited Mar. 31, 2001). 
342. CJ. Gottlieb v. SBC Communications, Inc., No. CV-OO-04139, AHM(MANx) (C.D. 
Cal. Apr. 18, 2000, amended Nov. 6, 2000) (asserting similar allegations), available at 
http://www.airtouchsuit.com (last visited Mar. 31, 2001). 
343. CJ. Dardaganis v. Grace Capital Inc., 889 F.2d 1237, 1244 (2d Cir. 1989) (finding 
that ambiguity in measurement of loss should be construed against the fiduciary); Donovan 
v. BieIWirth, 754 F.2d 1049,1056 (2d Cir. 1985) (same). 
344. See supra Part IlIA 
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under section 502(a) (3).345 Disgorgement is, however, a permitted 
statutory remedy under section 502(a) (2).346 Thus, resolution of 
this characterization issue may determine whether or not a remedy 
exists at all for the plaintiff-participants. 
Again, the better characterization from a policy perspective is a 
remedy payable to the plan under section 502(a)(2). Employer 
misuse and self-dealing in plan assets lay at the heart of the fiduci-
ary misconduct that drove Congress to enact ERISA. 347 The best 
way to deter such employer conduct is to allow for an effective 
remedy.34R The more broadly these disgorged profits are defined by 
the federal courts, the more effective this deterrent will be. 
SUMMARY 
Many workers today depend on their 401 (k) plan to provide 
them with an adequate income during retirement. For these work-
ers to achieve retirement income security, their 401 (k) plan 
investments must perform well over their working lifetime. Em-
ployers' selection of investment options for the 401 (k) plan, a 
fiduciary duty under ERISA, plays a critical role in determining 
investment performance. 
Federal court interpretation of this fiduciary duty will shape fu-
ture national retirement policy. In interpreting employers' duty of 
prudence, federal courts must balance the burden on each em-
ployer to investigate diligently investment options against the 
importance of this task in determining the retirement income of 
401 (k) plan participants. Federal courts should scrutinize, in par-
ticular, the level of fees associated with the investment options 
selected by the employer because of their adverse long-term im-
pact on 401 (k) plan retirement savings. The federal courts also 
should apply a heightened standard of prudence if the employer 
chooses to include company stock as an investment option because 
345. Mertens v. Hewitt Assoc., 508 U.S. 248, 266 (1993). The Supreme Court's decision 
in Harris Trust & Savings Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney Inc., 120 S. Ct. 2180, 2190-91 (2000), 
permitted a disgorgement of profit-type remedy under ERISA section 502(a)(3) in a suit 
brought by a employer-fiduciary against a nonjiduciary seroice provider who engaged in a pro-
hibited transaction. 
346. 29 U.S.C. § 1l09(a) (1994). 
347. See H.R. REp. No. 93-533, at 3-5 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.CA.N. 4639,4640-
43; S. REp. No. 93-127, at 3-5 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.CA.N. 4838, 4839-41. 
348. See Bienoirth, 754 F.2d at 1056 (recognizing that fiduciary abuses may be deterred 
by imposing personal liability on the fiduciary through ERISA's section 409 remedies). 
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it presents a higher degree of investment risk than a diversified 
mutual fund. 
Interpretation of employers' duty presents a different policy 
analysis for federal courts. Federal Courts must determine 
whether, in selecting the 401 (k) plan investment options, employ-
ers have received permissible incidental benefits or engaged in 
prohibited self-interested conduct. This Article illustrates how em-
ployers can engage in prohibited self-serving conduct when 
selecting (or deciding whether to retain) 401 (k) plan investment 
options. Such conduct may take the form of selecting investment 
options with higher fees in exchange for lower out-of-pocket ad-
ministrative costs for the employer. If the employer selects or 
retains company stock as an investment option, numerous oppor-
tunities exist for conflicts of interest to arise between the employer 
and the 401 (k) plan participants. 
Employers today rely upon the Department of Labor's 404(c) 
Regulations to allow participants to select among plan investment 
options without incurring potential fiduciary liability. A number of 
policy issues will arise as federal courts interpret the details of the 
404 (c) Regulations. This Article cautions against judicial interpre-
tations of the 404( c) Regulations that will have a potential chilling 
effect on voluntary plan sponsorship by employers. This Article 
also addresses an important exception to the 404(c) Regulations, 
the automatic enrollment plan. The federal courts are urged to 
interpret ERISA's duty of prudent diversification of plan assets and 
remedy provisions to encourage the employer to select a default 
investment option for automatically enrolled participants that is 
broadly diversified in the equity markets, rather than a low-earning 
money market fund. 
Federal courts are likely to confront three potential remedy sce-
narios in future 401 (k) plan fiduciary litigation. Plan participants 
may be injured by an employer's imprudent selection of invest-
ment options for the 401 (k) plan, either in the sense of a 
monetary or opportunity loss. Alternatively, plan participants may 
be injured by an employer's self-dealing misconduct with respect 
to plan investment options. Consistent with Supreme Court and 
existing federal caselaw concerning ERISA remedies, federal 
courts can and should afford each type of injury a remedy. 
The future of national retirement policy will be shaped by the 
degree of retirement income security that participants achieve 
through their 401 (k) plans. Stock market volatility places 401 (k) 
plan participants at risk of having an inadequate income for their 
retirement. Such risk will either be mitigated or exacerbated by 
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the cumulative impact of judicial interpretations of ERISA's fiduci-
ary duty provisions to individual 401 (k) plan cases brought before 
the federal courts. The hypothetical litigation scenarios presented 
in this Article illustrate the significant policy choices the federal 
courts will confront, knowingly or unknowingly, when applying 
ERISA's fiduciary duty provisions to 401 (k) plans. Finally, this Arti-
cle challenges the federal courts to recognize and, most 
importantly, embrace their policy-making role when rendering 
decisions in individual cases. 
